



Towards a New Partnership of the United Nations System and Global Civil Society

**Report of the Third Tokyo Colloquium, 16 March
2006**

Edited by Tatsuro Kunugi

Jointly Organized by

International Christian University Center of Excellence
and International Cooperation Research Association

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Published by International Christian University
21st Century Center of Excellence Program
With the support of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership

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Printed in Japan May 2006

Preface

This report is a compilation of contributions to an international workshop on *“Towards a New Partnership of the United Nations System and Global Civil Society”* convened on 16 March 2006 at the International Christian University (ICU) in Tokyo, Japan. This workshop is the third in an annual series of colloquium and forms part of a larger collaborative research project of the ICU's Center of Excellence Programme (COE) and the International Cooperation Research Association (ICRA).*

The purpose of this workshop was to bring together scholars and practitioners from a range of institutions and backgrounds from Canada, Japan and the US to scope a new trilateral research project that focuses explicitly on the current extent and future prospect of new partnerships between various civil society actors and the United Nations (UN).

The purpose of this report is to document the valuable contributions made by the keynote speakers and invited commentators, to capture the vibrant discussions and debates that unfolded during the workshop on the possible avenues for future research collaboration, and to record the support various notable individuals and institutions have expressed for this proposed collaborative research project.

The intention of this report is to serve as springboard to formulate concrete and actionable research proposals. The report is therefore structured as follows:

First, the introductory remarks made by Tatsuhiro Kunugi at the workshop, followed by his background paper on the public engagement of non-state actors in sustaining the UN reform process, are presented.

This is followed by the papers of the keynote speakers: Cyril Ritchie (President, Federation of International Institutions in Geneva) outlined a number of current partnerships between civil society and parts of the UN system. Vesselin Popovski (Director of Studies on International Order and Justice, United Nations University) assessed the current state of affairs in inter-state decision-making on key international security issues and the role civil society actors could play to move this dialogue further. And, Alistair Edgar (Executive Director, Academic Council on the UN System) explored the important question of what reasonable expectations and demands can be placed on the various actors – state and non-state. [Dianne Dillion-Ridgley's paper on interplay between government, NGO and business in the world will be available on ICU's COE website shortly.]

Next short papers by Takeo Uchida, Kazuo Takahashi and Mikoto Usui are presented, followed by comments from twenty invited commentators. These comments are arranged and grouped into: preliminary definitional question on designing future collaborative research (Martha Cottam, Otwin Marenin), remarks on the influence of civil society on foreign policy (Wilhelm Vosse), perspectives on the composition of a second UN General Assembly (Jacqueline Wasilewski), a discussion on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) versus social movements (T.V. Reed), parliamentarians' views on UN reform and civil

society (Wakako Hironaka, Yukihsa Fujita), viewpoints from a Canadian governmental perspective (David Drake), comments on institutional and administrative aspects of UN reform (Sumihiro Kuyama and Momoyo Ise), experiences of a range of different UN-civil society partnerships (Akio Nomura, Susumu Nakamaru, Midori Okabe, Yasushi Katsuma, Shinichi Hasegawa, Masanori Kobayashi), perspectives from Japan on a variety of issues related to UN reform and new partnerships with civil society (Akira Kawasaki, Kiyotaka Takahashi, Mikiko Otani), and lastly, specific question on designing future collaborative research. (Kunio Katakura, Yoshio Takano).

This report also includes an edited transcript of the recommendations made by the keynote speakers and the concluding reflections by Takeo Uchida. The report concludes with some notes and proposals by the Planning Committee of ICRA towards the next steps required to initiate and carry out concrete trilateral research on the important topic of new partnerships between civil society actors and parts of the UN system.

Annexed to this report, for reference, are also the Program of the workshop, a list of participants and two letters of support received from Paul Heinbecker (Director, Laurier Centre for Global Relations, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation(CIGI), and former Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN), and Michael Doyle (Chair, ACUNS Board and Professor at Columbia University) and Thomas Weiss (Director, Ralph Bunche Institute and Professor at City University of New York).

The organizers would like to take this opportunity to express their sincere appreciation for the valuable contributions made by the keynote speakers and invited experts and practitioners to the three dialogical sessions. They also wish to acknowledge with gratitude the support given by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership for the preparation of the trilateral research project. Warm thanks likewise go to our project collaborators for the organization of the workshop and completion of this record.

* The report of the first Colloquium (17 March 2004): *Taking Leadership in Global Governance – In the context of multiple actors and evolving issues* (English only), and the report of the 2nd Colloquium (24 March 2005): *Global Security and Poverty Reduction – Leadership of the UN at 60 and emerging civil society* (Japanese with English Summary) are placed on <<http://subsite.icu.ac.jp/coe/icra>>

As an outcome of research and lecture series organized as part of this joint project of ICU's COE and ICRA, two books will be published in Japanese during summer 2006 from Toshindo: *Working with International NGOs to Co-create a New World*; and *The United Nations and Emerging Global Civil Society*.

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INTRODUCTION

Introductory Notes by the Coordinator

Background Paper on Public Engagement of Non-State
Actors in UN Reform
Tatsuro Kunugi

Introductory Notes on the International Workshop

By Tatsuro Kunugi*
Coordinator, ICU-ICRA Research Project

At the beginning of the new century we find ourselves in the midst of turbulence and flux, which arguably provides a valuable opportunity to explore the prospects of new types of cooperative and participatory governance involving state and non-state actors. Yet, the lingering and intensifying dissatisfaction among many governments with the UN system in the center does not augur well at this crucial juncture of human history. It points to the need for the international community – comprising of states, non-state actors and, most importantly, the public at large – to find a way to forge a common vision, new guiding principles and more appropriate institutional mechanisms to meet the governance challenges of sustainable peace and equitable development.

By way of introduction to this International Workshop, I wish to highlight a few points.

The Main Purpose of the Workshop

First, the third annual meeting of our collaborative research project on “Leadership of the UN System in Emerging Global Civil Society,” is focused on selected issues of global governance. In particular, it aims to explore new avenues for strengthening partnerships between the UN system and civil society. This focus is considered both timely and important in view of the rather discouraging results obtained thus far of on-going UN reform efforts.

Secondly, the Workshop is a preparatory step to establish a trilateral research project among various institutions and individual experts in the United States, Canada and Japan on a new partnership between the UN system and global civil society. The project, among other things, aims to promote public engagement of non-state actors and social campaigns of people in the reform process of the UN.

International decision-making for the welfare of humankind is no longer the exclusive domain of sovereign states. Should public engagement of non-state actors succeed in producing tangible result in the UN reform process, new avenues would be opened to strengthen bottom-up participation – as already seen in the field of human rights, gender, environment, public health, international criminal justice, landmines and small arms. (My short article on “Public Engagement” relating to this question will be distributed at the Workshop.)

The reasons and motivations for “trilateral” US-Canada-Japan research will be considered during the Workshop from various angles.

Three key analytical themes that will structure the workshop's discussions are Synergistic Partnership, the Multi-stakeholder Approach, and Leadership.

Synergistic Partnership

The concept of governmental/non-governmental partnership is seen as starting point for creating new structures and processes to ensure better, more human governance at all levels. The partnership dynamics, however, is not only about how to develop institutions and make decisions. It also impacts the identification of what the goals and cardinal principles of governance should be in our highly pluralistic, dangerous, and radically unequal world. The ethical foundations of global governance are undergoing a shift which may, with a century of hindsight, be viewed as that which finally allowed humanity to come of age as a social being on a worldwide scale.

By and large, partnership is based on substantial independence and interdependence with explicit recognition that each partner contributes to a mutually beneficial relationship. In the context of global governance, however, the ultimate purpose should not merely be mutual benefit of the actors themselves, but also the well-being of humanity, service in the public interest, and the provision of global public goods. From these perspectives, the significance of synergistic partnership may be explored. (See Introduction in *Codes of Conduct for Partnership in Governance: Texts and Commentaries*, edited by T. Kunugi and M. Schweitz, UNU 1999.)

Multi-Stakeholder Approach

It can be argued that the nation-state has become too small to cope with transboundary realities, and too big to effectively deal with sub-national problems. However, there has been little perceptible change on the part of most sovereign states to delegate their authority upwards or downwards to the appropriate level. On the other hand, non-state actors have become increasingly active to compensate for or partially substitute the weakening state's power and functions to fill the gap and deficit in governance.

It is becoming widely recognized that a multi-stakeholder approach is not an option, but a necessity. In recent years there have been a number of encouraging developments in the modalities of multi-stakeholder approaches.

As discussed in the keynote speeches and some of the comments submitted to the Workshop, new modalities of multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation are evolving among governments, international organizations, civil society organizations and business groups. It is important to note that many of these initiatives came from the secretariats of UN system organizations and of civil society organizations, both national and international. The Global Compact is a welcome example of such a modality.

Insofar as the UN reform process is concerned, only limited multi-stakeholder dialogue was held among representatives of member states and those of civil society and business groups during the two-day sessions convened by the General Assembly President. Prior to the Summit Session in September 2005, numerous proposals and statements were made by civil society organizations. But, it seems doubtful that serious consideration was given to them by governmental delegations.

In Japan, thanks to the initiative of NGO leaders, a Public Forum on UN Reform was organized with the cooperation of the Foreign Ministry on 30 August 2005 and 2

February 2006. Hopefully, the Public Forum will be held on a regular basis and similar public participation events will be held in other countries too.

As noted in one of the keynote speeches, there are inherent and inevitable limitations to UN reform that is left almost entirely to governmental deliberations. As a result of the trade-offs among member states or groups of member states, several crucial issues such as disarmament, weapons of mass destruction and the cardinal principles on the use of force, have been dropped from the outcome documents of the General Assembly Summit Session. Furthermore, only a limited tangential reference is made to the multi-stakeholder approach in parts of the outcome documents.

One of the highlights of the Global Governance Commission's Report, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, issued early in 1995, was its special emphasis on the need for leadership. The Commission stated, *inter alia*:

“At national, regional, and international levels, within communities and international organizations, in governments and in non-governmental bodies, the world needs credible and sustained leadership. It needs leadership that is proactive, not simply reactive, that is inspired, not simply functional, that looks to the longer term and future generations for whom the present is held in trust.”

Dramatic changes are taking place continuously and globally since the beginning of the new century. They present yet more challenges to the UN system and other international institutions. A successful response to all these challenges will ultimately depend on the capacity and quality of institutional leadership. Such leadership, I would argue, would be particularly effective when it is exercised in concert with democratic and dispersed leadership of civil society.

In view of the importance of this question of leadership – which I would argue, is under-researched – a joint research project was set up in August 2003 under the auspices of the International Christian University's Center of Excellence Program (ICU/COE) and the International Cooperation Research Association (ICRA) to study “Leadership of the United Nations System in Emerging Global Civil Society.” This project envisions a global civil society built on synergistic partnerships in governance among all societal organizations and citizens. It explores the proactive leadership of the UN system and other international organizations to build and promote partnerships in the context of a growing number of actors and rapidly evolving issues of peace and development. It also aims to consider policy options for the global public, including international institutions.

Strong leadership and participative engagement are, unfortunately, often mutually exclusive, but when they are appropriately combined, synergy derived therefrom will be most effective and consequential for real problem-solving to today's world.

* Visiting Professor, Center of Excellence Program (COE), ICU; Visiting Professor, UNU-Institute of Advanced Studies (IAS)

Public Engagement of Non-State Actors in Sustaining the UN Reform Process

By Tatsuro Kunugi

We must form coalitions for change, often with partners well beyond the precincts of officialdom... We must spare no effort to make the United Nations a more effective instrument in the hands of the world's peoples for pursuing all three of these priorities – the fight against poverty, ignorance and disease; the fight against violence and terror; and the fight against the degradation and destruction of our common home.

Kofi Annan, *'We the Peoples': The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, 2000

Introduction

The 2005 World Summit Outcome document, adopted by the General Assembly at its High-level Plenary Meeting on 16 September 2005, contains several positive elements, such as the reaffirmation of efforts to realize the Millennium Development Goals, recognizing the special needs of Africa and to conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism; the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission and a Democracy Fund, and the inclusion of the responsibility to protect. However, in view of the ambiguous terminologies often used in many parts and the conspicuous absence of agreement on guidelines for the legitimate use of force, disarmament and non-proliferation, the document as a whole fell short of expectation about the long overdue reforms and new multilateral drive to tackle global security and poverty. Since reform is a continuing process, not a one-off event, it would be useful to address the limitations and shortcomings of the recent reform process and to explore the possibilities for spurring the process of change by weighing policy options as well as by building constituencies for change.

Two weeks after the Secretary-General's Report, entitled "*In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*," was issued on 21 March 2005, a conference was held in Waterloo, Canada, to address UN reform. It was organized by the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), in cooperation with the Academic Council on the UN System (ACUNS) and Wilfrid Laurier University, and some one hundred practitioners, scholars, civil society representatives as well as UN officials and diplomats participated.¹⁾ There was general agreement that UN reform was necessary and possible, but broadly speaking, countries of the South would privilege development over security and most of the North would do the reverse, giving rise to speculation about a possible grand bargain.

Two questions regarding the timing of UN reform and the approach to it were discussed at the conference. First, noting that the climate in Washington for major UN reform was inauspicious, some suggested "working with the US where possible and working around it where necessary against the day when the US might change its position on a given issue as it had on the Law of the Sea."

Secondly, it was observed that UN reform, although of much interest to policy professionals and scholars, was scarcely on the public's radar. Since most capitals were likely to respond to pressures from their citizens, it was necessary to mobilize the large networks of citizens and organizations devoted to, *e.g.*, security, development, human rights or arms control, in order to galvanize the reform impetus into a movement. It was also argued that non-state actors must be given some prominence in UN reform process and its follow-up as the multi-constituency processes, as recommended by the Cardoso Report (Report of the Panel of Eminent persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, entitled "We the Peoples: civil society, the United Nations and global governance," A/58/817, June 2004).

Only an oblique hint of my view on the first question is given in *Obiter dictum* to the present paper. To follow up on the second question, this background paper briefly discusses: (1) The influence of non-state actors on international decision-making at the UN; (2) Recent dialogue with non-state actors in the Security Council and the General Assembly; (3) Some transformative but non-structural changes proposed in the recent UN reports; (4) Member States' response to the proposals; and (5) Steps towards multi-stakeholder partnerships at the UN, in particular the public engagement of non-state actors in informing and sustaining the UN reform process.

1. The Influence of Non-State Actors

Commentators often portray the history of NGO (non-governmental organization – often called civil society organization – CSO) involvement in international governance as starting after WWII, but it started much earlier. NGOs and private sector organizations participated in international conferences and organizations, *e.g.*, International Telegraph Union, the Hague Peace Conferences and Paris Peace Conference, even before the establishment of the League of Nations, and since then in the League of Nations, ILO and other institutions.²⁾ There is, in fact, an important episode in the history of NGO involvement in the drafting of the UN Charter in San Francisco. In the spring of 1945 the Roosevelt Administration invited 42 American NGOs to place "consultants" on the US delegation, with the hope that their participation would contribute to winning the public support for the UN Charter. Their intense advocacy resulted in adding provisions on human rights, Chapter XI Declaration regarding non-self-governing territories and Article 71 on ECOSOC consultation with NGOs, none of which had been in the Dumbarton Oaks draft.³⁾

Statistical data show that there has been a steady increase in the NGO involvement in UN legislative/policy-making process and a marked increase in operational activities of the UN in the field of humanitarian emergencies, economic and social development and the environment. Reflecting on the long history of NGO involvement, Steve Charnovitz observed in 1997 that "in some ways NGO penetration into international organizations is no deeper than it was 70 years ago". According to him the NGO involvement seems to rise when governments need them and to fall when governments and international bureaucracies gain self-confidence, suggesting a cyclical pattern.⁴⁾ However, insofar as UN senior officials are concerned, they have recently been increasingly appreciative of the role played by NGOs and sometimes also by the private sector in the preparation and follow-up of a series of global conferences held since 1992 Rio Summit.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan echoed his predecessor's emphasis on the need for creating effective partnerships with civil society. In his proposal, *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform* (A/5/1950, dated 14 July 1997, paras. 212-213), he stated:

“Virtually no area of United Nations involvement, either at the policy or operational level, has been left unchanged by this process. Overall, civil society's increasing influence is contributing to a process of international cooperation and spurring the United Nations system and other intergovernmental structures towards greater transparency and accountability and closer linkages between national and international levels of decision making and implementing.

NGOs and other civil society actors are now perceived not only as disseminators of information or providers of services but also as shapers of policy, be it in peace and security matters, in development or humanitarian affairs. The involvement of NGOs and other actors, such as parliamentarians local authorities and business leaders, in the United Nations global conferences demonstrates this.”

On the other hand, it is doubtful that the same degree of recognition and appreciation of the non-state actors' role is widely shared by the governmental delegations to those conferences and by UN diplomats working in New York, Geneva, Vienna and other headquarters of the UN system agencies. In fact, Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 1997 proposal to hold a “Peoples' Assembly” to accompany a “Millennium Assembly” in 2000 received little support, and innovative proposals contained in the Cardoso Report on UN-Civil Society Relations have not been given serious consideration due to lack of much interest, or for worse reluctance, on the part of member governments.

It is to be noted that a number of important ideas and proposals made by non-state actors to the UN-sponsored world conferences held since 1992 have been either included in, or have contributed to strengthening of, the final text of declarations or plans of action adopted by the conferences.⁵⁾ It may appropriately be added that during the Cold War period the Socialist bloc countries and many developing countries with totalitarian regimes did not tolerate NGO's dissident voices in the UN deliberations and that since then NGO activists in human rights, gender, development, environment and indigenous peoples issues have become more vocal and important in the contexts that used to be considered as exclusive state prerogatives. In addition, there has been a number of transnational campaigns that started with the initiative of a small group of people, local or national civil society organizations but resulted in exerting major impact on international decision-making. They include, *inter alia*, campaigns in relation to: requests for Advisory Opinions on legality of the use of nuclear weapons; the establishment of the International Criminal Court; the Ottawa process; an abortive Multilateral Agreement on Investment; conflict diamonds; AIDS treatment; Jubilee 2000.

2. Recent Dialogue with Non-State Actors in the Security Council and the General Assembly

The role of business in conflict prevention, peace-keeping, and post conflict peace-building was taken up by the Security Council in an open debate held on 15 April 2004. Secretary-General Kofi Annan explained how private companies operate in many conflict zones or conflict-prone countries: the decisions of these companies on investment and employment, on relations with local communities, on protection of the local environment and on their own security arrangements can help the cessation of the conflict or can exacerbate the tensions. Furthermore the Secretary-General noted that private companies manufacture and sell the main hardware – from tanks to small arms and anti-personnel mines – and trade in natural resources, *e.g.*, oil, “conflict diamonds,” narcotics and timber.⁶⁾

On 22 June 2004, the role of civil society in post-conflict peace-building was also discussed in an open debate in the Security Council with the participation of NGO representatives. Kofi Annan emphasized that civil society organizations, both local and international had a role to play in the deliberative processes of the Security Council. Such organizations could help reduce the appeal of those trying to reignite conflict, could prepare local communities to receive demobilized soldiers and refugees, and could give a voice to the concerns of the marginalized.⁷⁾

As a follow-up to recent policy initiatives launched at the UN, including the Security Council debate on 15 April 2004, a symposium co-sponsored by the German Foreign Office, the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation and the UN Global Compact Office was held at the UN on 14 December 2004, to explore ways to scale up cooperation in support of conflict-sensitive business practices.⁸⁾

In response to repeated request made by NGO coalitions and in line with the Cardoso Report’s suggestion, the General Assembly held two-day informal interactive hearings with focus on UN reform, on 23 and 24 June 2005, with NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC, civil society organizations and the private sector. A cross section of 200 organizations and some 350 observers attended the hearings along with a number of Member States representatives.⁹⁾ General Assembly President Jean Ping underscored that the hearings represented a milestone in the relationship between Member States and civil society organizations and Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette also stressed that the hearings were a significant new step and that the format could be used again as part of the General Assembly’s efforts to further open up and interact with civil society. There was a broad consensus among participants that greater efforts should be taken to deepen the relations between the United Nations and civil society. Whether in new institutional arrangements proposed by the Secretary-General, such as the Peacebuilding Commission or the Human Rights Council, or existing mechanisms, NGOs underscored their desire to be included to a greater extent in discussions and implementation activities under the purview of Member States.

A UN Conference on Civil Society in support of Middle East was also held in Paris, 12-13 July 2005,¹⁰⁾ and a week later in New York on 19-21 July a Global Conference on the Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict and Peace-building was held.¹¹⁾ These conferences seem to indicate a recent tendency for an enhanced interest in dialogue between the UN and non-state actors on matters of

common concern.

3. Transformative but Non-structural Changes Proposed in the Recent UN Reports

The afore-mentioned Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on UN-Civil Society Relations (Cardoso Report) contains several proposals that would, when implemented, have a far-reaching transformative effect on the UN as a political institution. The paragraphs on one of the Panel's key proposals, *i.e.*, on fostering multi-constituency processes are particularly worth quoting in full as follows.

“II. Convening role of the United Nations: fostering multi-constituency processes

41. The most important contribution of the United Nations has always been its convening power, bringing together Governments of countries that are at war or at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. The same applies today, except that some of the world's major players are not governmental. Few of the most pressing battles today – whether they involve hunger, poverty, illiteracy, global pandemics, terrorism, narcotics, climate change, natural disasters, environmental threats, abuse of women and children, sectarian and ethnic divides, unemployment, economic crises or inequity of wealth, power and information – can be resolved by central Governments alone. Others are needed in these battles – from civil society, the private sector, local authorities and elsewhere. Why? Because they have essential knowledge, abilities, experience and links to key constituencies.

Shift the focus from generalized assemblies to specific networks

42. The United Nations needs to work with coalitions of actors with diverse but complementary capacities. This implies working with global policy networks, which are better placed to address contemporary challenges rather than conventional hierarchical organizations. They are more flexible and innovative; they generate and use information more efficiently, and they are better placed to identify and deploy needed competencies.”

In the concluding Chapter X on “Future of multilateralism,”¹²⁾ the Panel notes that its proposals have implications that are much wider than the UN's relations with civil society, and have a bearing on global governance and the future of multilateralism, which it says faces many threats and challenges today as it seeks to address new global priorities in the midst of an erosion of power and the resources.

The Panel cogently argues that the face of multilateralism is changing and is being increasingly shaped by ad hoc coalitions geared to specific goals comprising parties who are likeminded on a particular issue, but who may differ widely on other issues. The old notion of multilateralism was “omni-governmentalism” – in which all governments first agree on a policy and then move to implementation. The new notion embraces many from different sides who work together to gain support of their case. The Panel suggests that “the UN was not designed to service such multilateralism, but this is how the world often does business today. So the UN needs to internalize it to stay relevant.”

In summary, the Panel says that civil society and other constituencies (including

the private sector, parliaments and local authorities) are important to the UN because their experience and social connections can help the UN do a better job, improve its legitimacy, identify priorities and connect it with public opinion. Civil society can also raise new issues, focus attention on the moral and ethical dimensions of decisions in the public sphere, expand resources and skills, challenge basic assumptions and priorities and protest unfair decisions. Therefore, enhanced engagement, carefully planned, will make the UN more effective in its actions and in its contributions to global governance. The Panel states: “There is a synergy here, not a contest. The UN’s opportunities strengthen civil society, and this in turn empowers the UN, enhancing its relevance to the issues of our times.”

This report was submitted to facilitate the consideration of the General Assembly agenda “Strengthening of the UN: an agenda for further change” (A/57/387) which has a direct bearing on the UN reform process. Many of these important proposals, however, have not so far been given serious consideration by Member States.

Report of the Secretary-General in response to the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations Civil Society Relations (A/59/150), submitted on 13 September 2004, contains a number of suggestions and actions in connection with increasing the NGO participation, such as the accreditation process, improving the involvement of NGOs from developing countries and strengthening of the institutional capacity of the UN for engagement with NGOs. For the most part, however, they relate to administrative or procedural matters relatively of minor importance and do not directly relate to the Cardoso Report’s major recommendations of the far-reaching nature as discussed above. Most of the important transformative changes are merely commended to the attention of the General Assembly for consideration.

The Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, entitled “A more secure world: Our shared responsibility” (December 2004) only endorsed the recommendation of the Cardoso Report that “the General Assembly should establish a better mechanism to enable systematic engagement with civil society organizations.”¹³⁾ It did not refer to the Panel’s constructive proposals for strengthening the Security Council, including the improvement of the “Arria formula” meetings, field missions and independent inquiry commissions, connecting national foreign affairs committees and parliamentarians.¹⁴⁾

Millennium Project 2005 Report to the Secretary-General, entitled “Investing in Development – A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals” (known as “Jeffrey Sachs Report”) issued in January 2005, contains Recommendation 2 for providing a framework for engaging civil society and promoting the support of the private sector, as a part of MDG-based poverty reduction strategies. The following are some of the specific measures in Box 4 [Partners in pursuing the Goals] of its Overview document that are particularly noteworthy:

“Civil Society

....

Civil Society organizations can raise public and political awareness about the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), maintaining constructive pressure on governments to follow through on their commitments. They can help design national MDG-based poverty reduction strategies, ensuring that investment strategies attend to the needs of historically excluded

regions, groups, and policy issues. In monitoring progress, they can be public watchdogs, ensuring transparency in investment programs and accountability in budget management.

Internationally, civil society organizations can mobilize support among young people and other key constituencies to keep pressure on world leaders to follow through on political commitments. Through their work on the ground, they can be instrumental in sharing best practices and technical expertise.

Private Sector

Private businesses are important partners in achieving the Goals. Long-term poverty reduction in developing countries will not happen without sustained economic growth, which requires a vibrant private sector. In low-income countries, the majority of the labor force works in rural agriculture, so one powerful route to growth is through a boost in farm productivity and a transition from subsistence farming to commercial farming.

.... The domestic private sector can support the Goals by making investments to increase productivity and create jobs. In some situations, it can also help support service delivery through public-private partnerships. The private sector should furthermore support the Goals by promoting transparency and corporate governance initiatives, by advocating for the Goals, and by engaging responsibly with the government in economic policy discussions.

Major international businesses should support the Goals through corporate philanthropy, such as donations of life-saving technologies, and through differential pricing to enable the poor to gain access to needed technologies. As an important demonstration of corporate social responsibility, we recommend that all large international businesses, especially those that have signed up to the UN Global Compact, report their contributions through a Millennium Development Goals scorecard in their annual reports.”

The Secretary-General’s Report *In larger freedom* emphasizes the role of civil society and the private sector in relation to the “Imperative of collective action” (section C of Introduction, paras. 18-22) against a broad trend in the contemporary world in the following terms:

“Sovereign States are the basic and indispensable building blocks of the international system. It is their job to guarantee the rights of their citizens, to protect them from crime, violence and aggression, and to provide the framework of freedom under law in which individuals can prosper and society develop. States, however, cannot do the job alone. We need an active civil society and a dynamic private sector. Both occupy an increasingly large and important share of the space formerly reserved for States alone, and it is plain that the goals outlined here will not be achieved without their full engagement..

....

In our efforts to strengthen the contributions of States, civil society, the private sector and international institutions to advancing a vision of larger freedom, we must ensure that all involved assume their responsibilities to turn good words into good deeds. We therefore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability – the accountability of States to their citizens, of States to each other, of international institutions to their members and of the present generation to future generations.”

With regard to a framework for action to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the report recognizes a critical role of civil society organizations both within

countries and internationally as follows:

“Civil society organizations have a critical role to play in driving this implementation process forward to “make poverty history”. Not only is civil society an indispensable partner in delivering services to the poor at the scope required by the Millennium Development Goals but it can also catalyse action within countries on pressing development concerns, mobilizing broad-based movements and creating grassroots pressure to hold leaders accountable for their commitments. Internationally, some civil society organizations can help create or galvanize global partnerships on specific issues or draw attention to the plight of indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups, while others can work to share best practices across countries through community exchanges and providing technical support and advice to Governments.”

Furthermore, recalling that the Millennium Declaration reaffirmed that the General Assembly has a central position as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the UN, the report states that the General Assembly should engage much more actively with civil society – reflecting the fact that, after a decade of rapidly increasing interaction, civil society is now involved in most UN activities. It notes that “the goals of the United Nations can only be achieved if civil society and Governments are fully engaged, and it proposes that the General Assembly should establish mechanisms enabling it to engage fully and systematically with civil society” (para. 162).

4. Member States’ Response to the Proposals

Despite all these significant proposals, only brief references and endorsement were made to some of them in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. They include:

- enhancing the contribution of NGOs, civil society organizations, the private sector and other stakeholders in national development as well as in the global partnership for development (para. 22, e)
- channeling private capabilities and resources into stimulating the private sector in developing countries (para.24,d)
- ensuring that multiple institutions and international partners all work under one agreed framework on health issues (para.57)
- promoting gender equality and empowerment of women, (para.58)
- integrating a gender perspective and promoting full participation of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts (para. 116)
- strengthening cooperation between the UN and parliaments, in particular, through the Inter-Parliamentary Union, for furthering all aspects of the Millennium Declaration in all fields of work of the UN (para.171)
- welcoming the positive contributions of the private sector and civil society, including NGOs, and the local authorities in the promotion and implementation of development and human rights (paras. 172-73)
- encouraging responsible business practices such as those promoted by the Global Compact (para. 174)
- welcoming the dialogue between those organizations and Member States in the first informal interactive hearings of the General Assembly (para. 175).

The list is short and it is difficult to find other passages in the Outcome document that relate to the engagement of non-state actors with the work of the UN. Earlier versions of the Outcome document did not contain specific passages on the last four items on the list and they are welcome additions. What is sorely missing is the recognition of the role and responsibility of non-state actors, particularly in relation to peace and security function that is crucially central to the UN as a global political institution.

To put it bluntly, the basic approach of the Outcome document to peace and collective security is outmoded as it is state-centric with emphasis on the role of states, particularly major powers, and it fails to take account of the constructive role played by civil society organizations, as well as the social responsibility of the private sector in the field of security, including conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building, as earlier discussed with reference to Security Council meetings with the representatives of the private sector and civil society in April and June 2004. Recent studies such as *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector – Principles, mechanisms and practices* (published by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003) and *Peace Support Operations, Parliaments and Legislation*, edited by Alexander Nikitin, 2004, indicate greater interest and increased activities on peace and security on the part of parliaments in many countries. This also should have been taken into account. The Outcome document likewise fails to adequately deal with one of the key sectors of security, namely, the planetary security (the environment and resources) and it did not include any recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, apparently as a result of trade offs between negotiating groups.

In view of a marked tendency for multiple actors working together to cope with new and evolving issues, it is for consideration whether the concept of “cooperative security” should be reexamined in the new context. Cooperative security as advocated in a prescient manner in such studies as Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond* (1993) and Janne Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (1994) encompassed elements that are becoming increasingly more relevant today. It is a broad approach to “multidimensional security,” that emphasizes reassurances rather than deterrence, and it does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones. The approach is inclusive, accepting non-state actors’ role in addition to the role of states as the principal actors, and it stresses the value of creating the habits of multilateral dialogue. A certain adaptation of some of these elements might be useful; for instance, inclusivity of participation of non-state actors for synergistic partnership rather than merely working together, and acceptance of social responsibility by non-state actors for the prevention of conflict and post conflict peace-building processes. Furthermore, a combination of the cooperative security approach thus adapted with the operationalization of the concept of human security, *i.e.*, the protection and empowerment of people by way of redressing specific security deficits that should be identified and quantified, would help achieving effective and equitable security, in the world where there are competing claims for limited resources.¹⁵⁾ Justice requires fairness in procedure and equity in distribution; and cooperative human security therefore is an important means for achieving justice in the community of humankind.

5. Steps towards Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships at the UN

The impression is inescapable that member governments have responded to proposals for non-structural transformative changes of the UN without much enthusiasm. It is said that the concentration of energy on Security Council reform and 'quick win' solution to poverty has consumed too much oxygen. It is unfortunate because these reform proposals of far-reaching nature, if adopted, would greatly help strengthening the UN in the long run by working together with wider constituencies of all stakeholders and thereby bringing the UN closer to the peoples of the world. Historically and generally, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) have often followed an evolutionary path from a *forum of policy consultations* among states, to gradually develop into an institutionalized *framework for co-operation* for member states to pursue their own interests and sometimes deal with their common problems. In order to respond to major global issues which are beyond the control of individual states, there is a widely shared expectation today that the UN system, as an international organization, is now reaching the third stage and will gradually transform itself into an *actor* actively promoting the common interests and shared values of the emergent global society.

If the UN system as a universal IGO can gradually assume a leadership role in building and managing a quadrilateral partnership of governments, IGOs, NGOs and the private sector, it may eventually reach the fourth evolutionary stage transforming itself to be the core process of global governance by way of synergistic partnerships.¹⁶⁾

For the future evolution of the UN system, both the image and the reality of its work are important. Insofar as the troubled image of the UN's role in peace and security is concerned, the UN at present would appear to be at the nadir of its effectiveness. The fact remains, however, that thanks to much enhanced participation of non-state actors, as well as concerted efforts of states in other sectors of the greater UN system (encompassing activities in economic and social development, environment, health, education and so forth), neither the image nor the reality of the UN's performance in recent years has suffered very much.

It can be argued that the relevance and effectiveness of the working of the UN system could gradually be enhanced if the synergy-promotion function of the UN system were to be further nurtured. It is emphasized in this connection that the legitimacy of the UN system, to a large extent, hinges upon the enhancement of such a function in two ways.

First, it is important to recognize that today the concept of legitimate authority is undergoing a shift away from the traditional criteria of legal legitimacy, as derived from constitutional and other legal sources, to performance criteria of legitimacy. As such the criteria share the core characteristics of democratic governance, *e.g.*, respect for human rights, informed consent, popular participation, transparency, and accountability of the exercise of power. It is relevant to note here that Max Weber rightly conceived legitimacy to be a subjective disposition, namely, the willingness of people to subject themselves to a particular system of authority, and to accept its norms as binding. When these two ideas are applied to the UN system, its legitimacy depends on whether the world's people bestow authority and, therefore, legitimacy, on the UN system on the basis of an assessment of the UN's performance.

Second, there is no direct representative relationship between people around the world and the UN system, although civil society organizations acting on behalf of the world's people have become increasingly associated with policy process, as well as operational activities, of the UN system. Given that it is an inter-governmental organization, the UN's formal constituency is its member governments. The UN, as it was established sixty years ago, was and still is a "community of sovereign states" and it often fails to reflect a "community of humankind" in which individuals, civil society organizations and business entities are meaningful actors. Pressure to address the UN system's legitimacy gap by creating more explicit linkages to such actors (rather than only to states) will become stronger as these societal actors become increasingly empowered on the international stage.

If any representation system of non-state actors such as a "Second General Assembly" cannot be established soon in the intergovernmental structure of the UN, an important progressive step would be for the UN General Assembly to adopt a declaration on the principles of corporate, public and global governance that would help foster multi-stakeholder partnerships and multi-constituency processes. Elaboration of such a declaration in the form of a voluntary code of conduct addressed to all actors, including both state and non-state actors, could be done by the General Assembly with the interactive participation of representatives of member governments, parliaments, civil society and the business sector.¹⁷⁾ For that purpose, the format of the two-day interactive hearings held on June 23-24 will serve as a procedural model with some modifications. It is parenthetically added that voluntary codes of conduct that often treat states and non-state actors as partners on a co-equal footing (*e.g.*, Global Compact, Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, and UN Declaration on a Culture of Peace) contribute to wider and reciprocal acceptance of communal norms by each partner concerned, due to the multi-centric and multi-layered process of the operation of the codes. In addition, once accepted by partners, codes create expectations about the conduct of the partners that cannot easily be disrupted unilaterally.

"Second General Assembly" for which many proposals have been advanced in the past is always conceived as an assembly of non-governmental actors, *i.e.*, elected parliamentarians and/or representatives of civil society and the private sector. For maximizing the political legitimacy of interactive process of a Second General Assembly, I would argue that it should be an inclusive public sphere with member states, non-state actors and representatives of other inter-governmental organizations including regional organizations also participating, as appropriate. Depending on the priority issues to be taken up, selection of representatives could be made in a businesslike manner by applying explicit criteria for e-governance using advance communication technologies.¹⁸⁾ These steps (*i.e.*, elaboration and adoption of a declaration and setting up an inclusive public sphere) would conform with the broader trend towards human-centered democratic governance around the world, as well as with a shift to partnerships of all major actors in coping with global issues.

It is widely accepted that the resolution of interrelated global issues requires multi-sectoral and multi-actoral approach instead of a single-focus alliance of selected actors directly concerned. One of the four purposes of the UN as set forth in Article 1, para. 4 of the Charter is "To be a centre for harmonizing the action of nations in the attainment of these common ends," and in today's world it is necessary for the UN to harmonize the action of the private sector and civil society as well as "nations." By

working with civil society organizations which are capable of influencing how governments and businesses see their own interest in relation to global public goods in a longer term perspective, the UN system can gradually transform itself to be the center of global governance processes.

By and large, in view of the affinities of visions and the principles that guide the UN system and NGOs, efforts to build and manage strategic partnership between them should be less difficult than other types of bilateral partnerships. The UN's institutional effectiveness requires leadership to make necessary initiatives, coordinate various actions, facilitate compliance with relevant norms and oversee the implementation of decisions. Partnerships between the UN and NGOs have indeed contributed to such leadership, as demonstrated by the formation and functioning of a number of multi-stakeholder schemes that have been set up in the past 10 years or so. Global Biodiversity Forum, Global Water Partnership, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, and Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria are a few examples of multiple membership arrangements that are less formal than traditional international organizations and more suitable for inclusive participation of stakeholders concerned. It is hoped that public engagement of non-state actors in these numerous organizational arrangements will also be made in the newly established Peacebuilding Commission and the elevated Human Rights Council as well as in other institutions in the UN system.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion points to the need for the UN system to take the role of synergizer so that positive benefits deriving from synergistic participation of multiple stakeholders can be used to work towards human welfare. The key question now is how to ensure that this synergy indeed does occur and is effectively used.

There is an absence of a central authority for value allocation through collective decision-making based on consensual knowledge of the community of humankind. Therefore, there is a need for proactive leadership of the UN system in global planning and resource management, and building and managing multi-actor partnerships should be a central focus of such leadership. Without delving into a detailed discussion of this question, reference is made to what Robert Keohane considers three essentials of governance, namely, accountability, participation, and persuasion.¹⁹⁾ For our consideration of the legitimacy of synergistic partnerships within the UN system, rational persuasion and participative process provide the strong assurance of legitimacy for two reasons. First, people all over the world are increasingly better informed and more interested in active participation, and, second, multi-actor partnerships in the realm of the emerging heterarchical "community of humankind" have to rely on persuasion relating to norms, principles and values when they deal with the existing hierarchical "community of states" that are primarily preoccupied with power and interests.

UN leadership in fostering public engagement for evolving process of the UN reform will continue to be of crucial importance for enhancing global governance centering around the UN. Strong leadership and participative engagement are often mutually exclusive but perhaps most effective when appropriately combined.

Obiter dictum

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) who lived at a time when the old political order in Europe was collapsing and new problems both in state and in society were rapidly arising, has been differently regarded as an ardent nationalist, a pioneer of art and science of political power, and an unscrupulous seeker after the favor of despots, but it appears that he was in some ways a convinced democrat. Consistent with his favorable judgment of popular government where possible, and of monarchy where necessary, he spoke for a general freedom to propose measures for the public good and for liberty of discussion before a decision is reached. He said explicitly that government is more stable where it is shared by the many and he preferred election to heredity for choosing rulers. Moreover, he had a high opinion both of the virtue and judgment of an uncorrupted people as compared with those of a prince. In matters that fall within their understanding, they are both more prudent and more sound in their judgment than a prince. Machiavelli considered that nothing could be done with a horrible despotic prince; he could only be deposed. He sometimes emphasized the importance of wisemen's counsel and persuasion *vis-à-vis* people.²⁰⁾ What advice would Machiavelli offer today should a popularly chosen leader turn despotic and yet cannot easily be deposed?

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented at a joint meeting of the Japan Association for UN Study and the Korean Academic Council on the UN System, held in mid-September 2005 at the UN House in Tokyo.

- 1) See "Conference Report – The UN Adapting to the 21st Century" on CIGI's website <www.cigionline.org>. All papers presented at the conference and the organizer's Conclusions are published in Paul Heinbecker and Patricia Goff (eds.), *Irrelevant or Indispensable: The UN in the 21st Century*, Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 2005.
- 2) See an interesting and thorough historical review and analysis in Steve Charnovitz, "Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance," *Michigan Journal of International Law*, vol. 18, no. 2, 1997, pp.183-286.
- 3) See Dorothy Robins, *Experiment in Democracy – The Story of U.S. Citizen Organizations in Forging the Charter of the UN*, Parkside Press, 1971. According to the author, the UN, originally conceived as a security agency, became an organization also concerned with human rights and economic and social well-being of peoples everywhere, including dependent peoples; the Charter thus became a more liberal document.
- 4) Charnovitz, *supra*, note 2, pp.189-190.
- 5) See concrete examples discussed in Michael Schechter (ed.), *UN-sponsored World Conference – Focus on Impact and Follow-up*, UNU Press, 2001, and Thomas Weiss *et al.* (eds.), *UN Voices – The Struggles for Development and Social Justice*, Indiana Univ. Press, 2005, Chapter 11, pp. 398-405.

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- ⁶⁾ UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), *Go Between*, No. 103, April-May-June 2004, p. 38.
- ⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 39
- ⁸⁾ NGLS, *Go Between*, No. 106, Jan-Feb-Mar 2005, pp. 8-9; www.unglobalcompact.org
- ⁹⁾ Press Release GA/10359. Only a few representatives of the private sector groups such as the following made statement or took part in dialogue: World Business Council for Sustainable Development; Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights; International Organization of Employers; International Chamber of Commerce. Peace Boat, one of the international NGOs based in Japan, submitted recommendations entitled “Demilitarize Security and Develop Non-Violent Ways” which stated, *inter alia*, that they support the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission in which NGOs’ effective involvement is vital in order to make it a non-violent mechanism for sustainable peace, and that they oppose any proposals to increase the number of Security Council permanent members with a veto power; rather, imposing restrictions on the use of veto through informal agreement would contribute to democratic reform of the UN.
- ¹⁰⁾ Reading News, www.gppac.net
- ¹¹⁾ Press Release GA/PAL/986.
- ¹²⁾ Cardoso Report, paras. 177-187
- ¹³⁾ High-Level Panel Report, para 243
- ¹⁴⁾ Cardoso Report, Chapter V and VI (paras. 95-113), Proposals 12 and 15. “Arria formula” meetings are hosted by one of the members of the Security Council with one or more NGOs or other experts, but with no minutes. The purpose is to provide briefings on an issue of upcoming importance to the Council. The meetings are named after Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela who pioneered the approach.
- ¹⁵⁾ For further discussion of this point, see T. Kunugi, “Redressing Security Deficits in Our Fragmented World: UN Perspective and Beyond,” *Toward a Peaceable Future*, edited by Murakami, Kawamura and Chiba, Thomas Foley Institute, Washing State University, 2005.
- ¹⁶⁾ The term “synergy” is used here to mean that the effect obtained from the combined cooperative action of, or interaction between, two or more distinct actors is greater than that obtained from the sum of their independent actions. The effect obtained could be shared by other actors and by the public at large. It is therefore different from symbiotic mutualism, in which two or more actors derive mutual benefit from living together. Likewise, synergistic partnerships are different from business partnerships. The purpose of business partnerships, according to *Bouvier’s Law Dictionary*, is the exclusive sharing of profits/benefits by partners alone, whereas the primary purpose of partnership for global governance should be the inclusive sharing of benefits for the well-being of humanity and other forms of global public goods. The term “leadership” means “enlightened leadership” as it is used in *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, Oxford Univ. Press 1995, pp. 37-39 and pp. 353-57.

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- ¹⁷⁾ See Declaration of Accountability for Global Governance, adopted at the Citizens Conference on UN-NGO Relations, San Francisco, 21-24 June 1995 and other global framework documents in Part VII of *Codes of Conduct for Partnership in Governance: Texts and Commentaries*, edited by T. Kunugi and M. Schweitz, UNU, 1999.
- ¹⁸⁾ Part III of the Cardoso Report contains specific recommendations and caveats regarding ‘partnership in UN operations and deliberations’ (paras. 68-73) and 8 points of ‘partnership strategy’ (paras. 74-75). These recommendations along with recent technological innovation in e-government and e-governance deserve serious consideration.
- ¹⁹⁾ See Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World” in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance*: Polity Press, 2002.
- ²⁰⁾ George Sabine, *A History of Political Theory*, (1937) 1959 edition, Chapt. XVII; *Machiavelli and Republicanism*, edited by G. Bock, Q. Skinner and M. Virolli, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990; and Kobayashii Yoshiaki and Kim Tae-Chang (eds.), *Publicness from the Perspective of Leadership* (“leadership” kara kangaeru kōkyōsei), Tokyo Univ. Press 2004, Chapt. I containing records of paper presentation by Shogimen Takashi and discussion that followed.

CHAPTER 1

KEYNOTE SPEECHES

New Partnership of the United Nations System and Civil Society

Cyril Ritchie

UN Reform Process and Multistakeholders

Vesselin Popovski

Leadership of the UN System and Civil Society

Alistair D. Edgar

New Partnership of the United Nations System and Civil Society

By Cyril Ritchie
President

Federation of International Institutions in Geneva

Introduction

“For the United Nations System, cooperation with Civil Society is no longer an option, it is a necessity.”

When the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, made this statement in the course of his keynote speech in December 1999 to the World Civil Society Conference (WOCSOC, Montreal, Canada) it resonated through the Conference Plenary Hall and was greeted enthusiastically as a challenging and clarion call to partnership, to new partnership, to extended and deepened partnership. We in civil society networks have since then quoted this limpid sentence on thousands of occasions.

And Kofi Annan has many times demonstrated his genuine commitment to such partnerships. One need only think of his setting up of the Cardoso Panel and of his written response to it; of his references to Civil Society in his 2005 Report “In Larger Freedom”; of his dropping in this very month on the Board Meeting of the Conference of UN NGOs (CONGO) and saying “I count on you to keep knocking on governments’ doors: without your constant advocacy we cannot achieve the panoply of reform measures that the UN is engaged in.”

Kofi Annan, of course, surely knows better than most that achieving new UN-CS partnerships is not easy, not to be taken for granted, and not without inherent resistance, both within the UN system and within some parts of Civil Society. Before examining some of the obstacles and ways to overcome – or at least circumvent – them, let us look firstly at the variety of relationships that have developed over the years and draw some lessons from them.

Experience of Recent Decades

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) frequently provide expert knowledge and advice, both to the decision-making bodies of the UN System and to the Secretariats that implement UN decisions. CSOs bring to the UN table the views of important constituencies whose voices may not be adequately reflected by governmental delegations and whose knowledge and views can constitute important input to informed decision-making. There is a famous phrase in a report for the UN’s 50th Anniversary (Union of International Associations, 1995, authored by Andrew Rice and Cyril Ritchie) also adapted and quoted repeatedly ever since: “In the decision-making process, competent input from CSOs enhances responsible output from governments.”

Furthermore CSOs can be major channels of dissemination to their members and

to the public of serious information on UN activities and potential, thus helping to fill the knowledge gap left by the inadequate – and often irresponsibly hostile – coverage given to the UN by the media. CSOs can build support for UN programmes – and can participate jointly in UN programmes - through education and mobilization directed to the public and to pinpointed constituencies. Examples would include various “UN Days” (e.g. World Food Day, World Refugee Day, and others) or “UN Years” (e.g. Microcredit, Desertification and others) or “UN Decades” (e.g. Literacy, Water for Life and so on).

There are also specific cases where close cooperation with international and national CSOs is quite simply indispensable to UN agencies in carrying out their missions: both UNICEF and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees contract and interlink with CSOs/NGOs in multiple field operations. The World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) both designate partner CSOs/NGOs as executing agencies for given projects. The same is true on occasion for UNESCO, for the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), and of course for the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

Keeping for the moment to the agencies and secretariats of the UN system – I will come later to the intergovernmental organs and processes – there is a plethora of good partnership practices that merit the citing of some illustrations:

- a) The World Bank for years funded the entire administrative budget of the NGO-World Bank Committee, many of whose actions were critical and confrontational to Bank programmes, and which sought to offer contrasting alternatives to World Bank approaches.
- b) The UN Electoral Assistance Fund has provided assistance to CSOs/NGOs to monitor national elections in Member States.
- c) The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) had an INGO partner for a joint collaborative programme on tropical cyclone research, which included using an unmanned aircraft observing system.
- d) The World Conference on Education for All (Jomtien, 1990), organized jointly by four intergovernmental secretariats, was an “equality of participation” event: governments, IGOs and NGOs all had the single status of participants, without hierarchy.
- e) On the last two occasions when the post of UN High Commissioner for Refugees was open, a number of the known or declared candidates accepted to respond to public questioning on their motivations by a major INGO network, and published their views and outlook on the network’s website. Indeed on the most recent occasion (2005) the UN Secretary-General invited NGOs as well as governments to submit candidates. This innovation might well be universalized!

Some good practices have also been adopted at the level of intergovernmental machinery:

- a) The Committees which monitor the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child or the UN Convention against Torture conduct review sessions in which the principal substantive input is from national and international CSOs/NGOs. It should be noted in passing that both these Conventions (and many others such as Landmines, Child Soldiers, Small Arms) owe their origins and their effective coverage to NGO initiatives and professional input.

- b) An International Code of Conduct for Germplasm Collection and Transfer was proposed by an NGO in 1989 and adopted by the FAO Conference in 1993.
- c) The UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio, 1992) adopted the frame of 9 Major Groups (eight covering Civil Society and one for Business and Industry) as the institutional mechanism of partnership with governments in advocating and implementing Agenda 21. The follow-up UN Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) has year by year strengthened the use of this mechanism, to the point where since the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002), representatives of the Major Groups are an integral part of the preparation for and decision-making of the UNCSD.
- d) The governmental process leading to the World Summit on the Information Society (Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005) made it possible for an “official” Civil Society Bureau to be created, representing a range of stakeholders (some 25 “civil society families”) and engaging in open dialogue with the Summit governmental Bureau. Civil society advocacy and professional bodies were able to provide relevant input to the drafting of the texts of the major Summit documents. The emergence and functioning of the Civil Society Bureau received significant support from the intergovernmental Summit Secretariat. And in the follow up to WSIS, currently in process, the same Civil Society constituencies have been incorporated in the planning for the Internet Governance Forum and the transformation of the UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development, which is to become the follow-up intergovernmental mechanism.
- e) There have been and are several examples of full integration of CSOs/NGOs within a United Nations organ, on an equal footing with the intergovernmental units or agencies: the Safe Motherhood Global Initiative; the Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Cooperatives (COPAC); the International Land Coalition (formerly known as the Popular Coalition to eradicate hunger and poverty); the Programme Board of UNAIDS; the Inter-Agency Standing Committee of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance; the Global Cooperative Campaign against Poverty, jointly coordinated by ILO and the International Cooperative Alliance.
- f) The Security Council itself has practiced the “Arria formula” over several years. The Arria formula brings to its members independent CSO/NGO perspectives and fresh – often field-based – information, notably relating to crisis situations. Arria-formula sessions are now frequently supplemented by informal meetings of Security Council members with NGOs both in New York and at field-mission levels.

The Cardoso Panel Report of June 2004, and the Secretary General’s own action-oriented follow-up Report to the General Assembly (September 2004), have not led to any resolution being adopted by the General Assembly. However this has not prevented several welcome steps being taken to open new doors to cooperation. For example:

- a) In July 2005 the Global Conference for the Prevention of Armed Conflict – entirely organized by NGO networks – was held in the UN at the invitation of the Secretary-General. The Conference had services, support and participation only paralleled by the annual NGO Conference of the UN Department of Public Information. Moreover the leaders of the July Conference were invited in September to an open debate of the Security Council on conflict prevention and

resolution, leading to a UN Security Council Presidential Statement incorporating the words “The Security Council underscored and will strengthen its relationship with civil society.”

- b) In June 2005 as part of the preparations for the UN Summit of September 2005, Civil Society Hearings were held under the auspices – and under the direct control – of the UN General Assembly President. While there should of course have been other steps and other involvement by Civil Society in the substantive lead up to the Summit, the June Hearings constituted a significant breakthrough in dialogue with governments, several of whom explicitly requested that the experience be renewed. Through their contributions the majority of CSOs at the Hearings demonstrated high levels of competence and responsibility. In 2006 the new UN General Assembly President has undertaken to facilitate three thematic Hearings in relation to General Assembly special topics (HIV/AIDS, Least Developed Countries, Migration) and one general Civil Society Hearing. This is indeed work in progress.
- c) Other initiatives of the 2005 Summit that involve – and must involve – CSO participation if the decisions are to be truly implemented include the renewed commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission; the acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine; the establishment of a new Human Rights Council; the elimination of gender discrimination and of violence against women and girls; a scaling up of responses to major diseases; an effective Central Emergency Revolving Fund; and the implementation of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

Advocacy Today and Tomorrow

The above catalogue might be seen just as a wish list. Indeed too often the moving and comprehensive declarations and action programmes adopted collectively by governments in UN Summits and Conferences have remained lamentably unfulfilled. Serious political will is too often lacking to grapple with the problems that have been identified, and totally inadequate funding is provided by governments to “their” UN to enable it to play the catalytic, coordinating and programmatic roles that constitute its mandate.

It is here that the voices of competent and relevant CSOs need to be heard – and need to be listened to! CSOs have a crucial role nationally and internationally in helping and encouraging – and if need be, prodding and shaming – governments into taking the actions to which they have given endorsement in international fora. CSOs are essential actors before, during, and increasingly after governmental decision-making sessions.

Slavery was abolished by governments after public advocacy and outrage manifested by citizens groupings – what we now call CSOs. The same is true of the downfall of apartheid, of colonialism, of communism. In recent decades the world has been changed for the better – though we still have a long way to go – by the women’s rights movement; by the environmental movement; by the CSO coalitions on such themes as Landmines, the International Criminal Court, the Jubilee Campaign on debt reduction, the Global Call to Action against Poverty. And of course the world is also bettered by the patient and professional year-round work of the hundreds and thousands of NGOs that have a consultative relationship with the UN System, working on the rule

of law, on labour standards and decent work, on anti-corruption, on sustainable development, on social justice, on reproductive health, on standard-setting in so many areas of the economy and of daily life.

This partial listing indicates the growing need, and growing trend, for civil society to foster networks within which advocacy and operations are mutually reinforcing. CSOs need to develop, practice and monitor Codes of Conduct that will underpin their work, their legitimacy, their accountability. Here too, networking is essential.

The United Nations and its member governments need to be able to count on competent and responsible Civil Society Organizations to get to grips with the multiple problems of the world. Equally, CSOs need to count on responsive and accountable governments that will fulfill their commitments. Perhaps governments may need to recall that the millions upon millions of members, supporters, affiliates and volunteers who make up Civil Society are also voters. Their decisions when election day comes will take account of the effective partnerships achieved in the past and desired in the future. CSOs represent participatory democracy at its best.

UN Reform Process and Multi-Stakeholders

By Dr. Vesselin Popovski
 Director of Studies on International Order and Justice
 UN University

The latest UN reform process is in deadlock. The UN Secretary General Report (SGR) 'In Larger Freedom' (March 2005) provided a forward-looking intellectual vision, however the UN Member States at the General Assembly (GA) could not agree on many issues. This ended with a disappointing World Summit Outcome (WSO) document (September 2005), revealing the limits of interstate decision-making. Can the UN reform process be helped by proactive engagement of multiple stakeholders? What would such partnership look like? Addressing these difficult questions, my paper will undertake three preliminary tasks:

- (1) Identifying the gap between the SG and the GA on UN reform by comparing the SGR and the WSO;
- (2) Exploring the problematic relationship between the state and civil society;
- (3) Shortly list some examples of where CSOs were instrumental to the successful implementation of international agreements.

Gap between the SG and GA Documents on UN Reform

Expansion of Threats

Both the SGR and the WSO acknowledge that the threats to international peace have expanded and urgent collective responses are required. Apart from armed conflicts, proliferation of weapons, terrorism, organized crime, the SGR followed the High-Level Panel Report (HLPR) to list threats linked to poverty, infectious diseases, insufficiently early warning for natural disasters, environmental degradation, lack of access to education and technology as important threats to international society. The WSO, in a more economical wording, re-affirmed that the threats 'must be tackled at the global, regional and local levels'. It mentioned the 'vital importance of an effective multilateral system', the need for 'security consensus based on the recognition that many threats are interlinked' and stressed that 'no State can best protect itself by acting entirely alone'.

Collective Security

The expectations and hopes for 'collective security system' in the HLPR and SGR, as in many previous documents, were too high. The founders of the UN had fewer illusions. The Charter, in fact, never promised that its machinery will tackle and resolve every conflict everywhere. The Charter granted the Security Council (SC) a 'primary', but not an 'exclusive' role in the maintenance of peace. The idea 'collective security' has obvious strong grounds – as a safeguard against common threats and as a demand for collective actions. But it has always suffered from a lack of commitment and insufficient implementation. As a result today, like 60 years ago, 'collective security' is still more a belief, rather than a reality.

Use of Force

The WSO was disappointing in a variety of ways. It totally avoided the issue of self-defense, and failed to reach a definition for terrorism. The UN praised the role of the SC in maintaining international peace, but failed to arrive at a consensus on how to enlarge its membership, or whether to adopt the five legitimacy criteria on the use of force. The SGR made a gallant attempt to clarify the distinction between "imminent" and "non-imminent" threats, with the first group to be fully covered by the first legal option, self-defense, and the second group to trigger the second legal option, the authorization by the SC under Chapter VII. These clear propositions were, however, attacked from both sides: some States condemned the concept of imminent threats, noticing behind it a possibility to bypass the restrictive language of Art. 51 and thus labeling situations, other than strict armed attacks, as prompting self-defense. Other states (US) were not happy with limiting self-defense only to imminent threats. As a result the threshold after which non-imminent threats become imminent and trigger self-defense has not been determined. This issue remained as divisive as ever throughout the GA deliberations, and at the end the WSO was limited to general UN Charter language.

Another major effort in the HLPR and SGR – to introduce five legitimacy criteria for the use of force – also failed. These five criteria, namely, seriousness of the threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportionality and chance of success, were initiated as appropriate tests to control states exercising use of force outside the SC mandate in a Kosovo-type scenario. The HLPR attempted to oblige the SC to take into account the five principles every time it decides to authorize the use of force. The SGR proposed a 'soft' acceptance of the principles as a way of facilitation to reach agreement, without demanding codification in a resolution, as the HLPR intended. But even this did not help: Although the drafts of the outcome document the GA still mentioned one of the criteria, the last resort, and recognized the need to continue discussing the others – all such references were deleted from the WSO.

Terrorism

The definition of terrorism, as suggested by the HLPR and endorsed by the SGR, describes it as any action 'intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians with the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a government or international organization to do or abstain from doing any act'. One of the problems with the definition of terrorism has been the dispute around the so-called 'state terrorism'. The SGR made an essential, almost revolutionary, suggestion: to identify 'state terrorism' within the domain of regulation of the use of force and, therefore, to detach it from the negotiations on the definition of terrorism. One cannot deliberately kill or maim civilians for whatever purpose, whether it be national self-determination, resistance to occupation, retaliation against 'state terrorism' etc. Interestingly, the insistence to broaden the definition of terrorism to include 'state terrorism' may achieve the opposite effect. States indeed commit crimes, but these are more appalling and punishable crimes, than terrorism! Illegal use of force, aggression, foreign occupation, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes already face universal *jus cogens* condemnation, prohibition and prosecution. Renaming these crimes 'state terrorism' would reduce, not increase the guilt of their perpetrators. To put it differently, defense lawyers of someone like Saddam Hussein would welcome the opportunity to defend their client against ambiguous and unclear charges of 'state terrorism'.

The definition on terrorism came after difficult debates in the GA. The first draft outcome document kept the definition, and to satisfy some sympathies to Palestinians, added 'foreign occupation' as one of the factors that may contribute to terrorism. The second draft came even closer to the SGR, by keeping the draft definition and dropping the text on 'foreign occupation'. The WSO, however, could not sustain the draft and omitted the text entirely. Failing on the definition, the WSO could still come up with an initiative to convene a high-level conference under the auspices of the UN to formulate an international response to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. After all, it supported every other part of the SGR on terrorism, including the commitment for a conclusion of a comprehensive Convention by summer 2006.

Peacekeeping

The SGR welcomed the creation of standby peacekeeping troops and re-stated Brahimi report's wish to see an interlocking system of capacities that will enable the UN to work with regional organizations in reliable partnerships. The SGR introduced a 'zero tolerance' policy towards the misconduct and sexual exploitation of minors and other vulnerable people by UN personnel and demanded criminal investigation and prosecution of all such acts. However, this policy should not have been limited only to acts against 'minors or vulnerable people', rather any sexual exploitation must be prohibited. A new idea is to create a panel to examine how to censure states that refuse to investigate and punish the crimes committed by their troops, and consider delisting them as possible troop contributors until they have done so. Among the other tasks, mentioned in the SGR, are the common training manuals and doctrines to ease the participation in UN-authorized peacekeeping missions and the joint planning exercises and consultations on logistical and doctrinal issues involved in UN peacekeeping. The WSO offered general support for these.

Peacebuilding

The SGR recognized the severe problem that 'no part of the UN system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries in their transition from war to lasting peace'. It built on the idea of the HLPR, and proposed a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and a Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO) within the UN Secretariat. It also put forward stipulations for their role and functions, structure and line of reporting. It is essential that the PBC is able to draw on the resources of international financial institutions, relevant UN agencies and programmes, and regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as on independent sources of expertise, for information, analysis, and perspectives. The WSO supported the initiative, and so the PBC and PSO were created in December 2005. This marks the only significant structural changes in the UN thus far that include the participation of non-state actors.

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

The GA could not break the deadlock on disarmament and non-proliferation. So the drafting efforts of the SGR and earlier GA initiatives in this field came to naught. Among those were general re-commitments to already existing regimes, but also important innovative texts. This is a bitter bite, given that the SGR actually made a significant number of forward-looking recommendations. It remains unclear why the

GA decided to simply remove the entire topic from the WSO. Despite the obvious lack of progress, keeping the matter on the agenda could at least result in some general re-commitments.

Sanctions

The SGR repeated the language of the HLPR, including the interesting perception that sanctions serve not only to punish, but also to prevent threats to international peace. A legal purist may note inconsistencies with Chapter VII of the Charter, which strictly requires finding an existing ‘threat to the peace’ as a necessary condition to impose sanctions. The SGR suggested using Art. 41 before, not only after the threats occur. One can only admire such advance – after all, sanctions can help to produce agreements. They can be part of delicate carrot-and-stick mediation to reach a peaceful solution before the conflict escalates into a real ‘threat to the peace’. The emphasis on prevention and early warning is always beneficial, as it saves human lives. It could also be easier and cheaper. The WSO did not follow this advice, and conservatively remained within the traditional interpretation of sanctions. In the aftermath of the Volcker’s report, it urged the SC and the SG ‘to ensure that sanctions are implemented in an accountable manner’ and ‘that fair and transparent procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions’ lists, and for removing them’.

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The WSO endorsed the idea of R2P. It also added admirable and important positive obligations – ‘to help states build capacity to protect their populations ... and to assist those ... under stress before crises and conflicts break out’. However, the WSO failed to remind decision-makers about the negative obligation – to punish the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Earlier drafts of the GA outcome documents contained a separate R2P paragraph on “Impunity” which demanded justice and an end to in co-operation with the ICC, ad hoc tribunals and other mechanisms for international justice. Instead, the baby and bath water were thrown out, for rather than deleting only the reference to the ICC (arguably justifiable as the ICC is independent from the UN) the WSO deleted the whole concept. This marks a step back even from the Genocide convention, which requested states not only to prevent, but also to punish genocide. Moreover, it already made reference to a future permanent criminal court in 1948!

Problematic Relationship between the State and the Civil Society

Civil society is generally considered morally superior to the state, although this is actually more a declaration than an empirically proven fact. Civil society literature¹, especially in the context of mobilized support for human security or peacebuilding, stresses the importance of social capital² – it presents people as willing to associate, co-

¹ Thomas Carothers, ‘Civil Society’ in *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1999-2000, pp. 18-29) Gary Rodan, ‘The Prospects for Civil Society and Political Space’ in Acharya, Frolic and Stubbs eds. *Democracy, Human Rights and Civil Society in Southeast Asia* (Toronto: 2001); and ‘Civil Society and Other Political Possibilities in Southeast Asia’ in *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 27, No.2 (1997)

² Percy Lehning, ‘Towards a Multicultural Civil Society: The Role of Social Capital and Democratic Citizenship’ in *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1998)

operate, learn and participate in democracy. Civil society occupies the middle ground between the state and the private sector, therefore it is engaged in neither government activities, nor in commerce directly. However, indirectly it has both a political and economic angle – it is supposed to control and balance the state and support market freedom. The academic literature does not necessarily provide a clear normative answer as to why civil society is superior to the state. In the international arena, sub-state terrorist organizations, clearly prove this assumption wrong. The sub-state level is seen as closer to people, but does this mean that it necessarily strives for good and does not have a legitimacy deficit on its own? Every society has to prove that it is indeed ‘civil’, not ‘uncivil’.

There is some recognition in the literature that civil society can be a source of conflict³. Knight wrote that ‘not all elements in civil society are benign and progressive. Some of them represent the criminal underbelly of society and others represent reactionary and exclusionary movements’⁴. But these warnings are largely ignored, and work on civil society usually moves towards uncritical praise of civil society as a whole.

The human security concept, although focusing on people, regards them as recipients of rights to be satisfied by efforts from states, rather than by non-state agents. The literature on human security⁵ and the peacebuilding⁶ has started to pay attention to civil society both as a source of stability and as means of achieving their ends. They see it as a factor in imposing ‘constraints on state sovereignty through the mobilization of international civil society to safeguard international norms’, as ‘sharing of power between state and non-state actors in a globalizing world’⁷. In practical terms the reliance on civil society has been translated into the work of various NGOs: ‘The main focus of civil society-building has often been local NGOs as a sphere for articulating needs independently of vested political interests and involving grassroots community voices’⁸.

Civil society is gradually recognized as a location for how to learn to co-operate, resolve disputes peacefully, and identify and achieve common goals. Are the state and civil society in competition or in partnership? Lucian Pye wrote that civil society, which consists of diverse autonomous interest groups, can exert pressure on the state, promote liberal democracy, and critically address the underlying cause of social conflict⁹.

³ Sandra MacLean, ‘Contributions from Civil Society to Building Peace and Democracy’ in Ann Griffiths (ed) *Building Peace and Democracy in Post-Conflict States* (Halifax, 2001) p. 31-50

⁴ Andy Knight, ‘Engineering Space in Global Governance: the Emergence of Civil Society in Evolving ‘New’ Multilateralism’ in Michael Schechter (ed) *Future Multilateralism* (UNU Press 1999) p. 256

⁵ Commission on Human Security, Report of the Third Meeting, Hague Castle, Stockholm, 9-10 June 2002; Nicholas Thomas and William Tow, ‘The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention’ in *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (June 2002)

⁶ Elizabeth Cousens and others eds, *Peacebuilding as Politics* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2001); David Chandler, ‘The Limits of Peacebuilding: International Regulation and Civil Society development in Bosnia’ in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 1999); Oliver Richmond, ‘The Globalisation of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus’ in *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2004)

⁷ Thomas and Tow, p. 178

⁸ Chandler, p. 110

⁹ Lucian Pye, ‘Civility, Social Capital and Civil Society: Three Powerful Concepts for Explaining Asia’ in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 764

The main dilemma still is between the assumed moral superiority of civil society and the power of states to be guarantors of international peace and human security. Peace cannot be built without legitimacy, without meeting the expectations of people, but also not without the power of states to preserve a stable evolution. Peacebuilding, therefore, is pushing for the strengthening of both state and civil society and yet, according to the theory that they draw upon, the two are expected to be in conflict, rather than in harmony. The question is: Are calls for a strong civil society role – as heard in discussions on peacebuilding, human security – adding new conflict dynamics and potential instabilities to already existing ones?

Conclusions

The above analysis of the SGR and WSO shows a growing gulf between legality and legitimacy. Articulated clearly with relevance to the use of force in the HLPR, this disconnect has much broader implications. The legal authority to make collective decisions has always been vested entirely in interstate decision-making. When reading the WSO document one can question whether such decision-making can produce substantive change and reform. One alternative to bridge legality and legitimacy is to accept that civil society ('we the people') can be part of the legalization of international order. None of the UN documents so far have taken such a progressive step, preferring instead to see civil society as a monitor, rather than a player. One understandable problem is that civil society itself needs to strengthen its legitimacy and prove that it will be a force working for good, rather than distracting from it. Yet, one cannot deny that major progresses recently in several fields of international law – human rights, international accountability, environmental regimes etc. – has been due to the energy and force of non-state actor engagement.

Leadership of the UN System and Civil Society

By Dr. Alistair D. Edgar
Executive Director
Academic Council on the UN System (ACUNS)

Introduction

In addressing the overall theme of the workshop, “Towards a New Partnership of the United Nations System and Global Civil Society”, it is important to begin by setting out a basic framework of reference. This framework refers, first, to who the relevant actors are that make up the potential partnership; and second, to the reasonable limits that should be maintained in (and the reasonable expectations and demands that should be placed upon) the relationships between these various actors. The first of these is relatively simple, consisting of a basic listing of types of actor in international (multilateral) relations. The second point, however, takes us further into debates about political-action boundaries amongst these actors. This latter discussion, therefore, will inform the main body of this presentation.

The Cardoso Report of 2004 has offered conservative suggestions which have met with criticism by many NGOs, while the World Social Forum movement has provided a radical alternative revisionist outlook that may generate more heat than light. The argument being advanced for consideration here is that both may in fact overstate the need for broad structural approaches to reform in UN-civil society relations. What might be more useful – though admittedly less dramatic - is a renewed focus on the process of establishing *ad hoc* coalitions between states, CSOs and even private sector actors, of the sort that in the 1990s led to the Antipersonnel Landmines Ban Treaty and the Rome Summit on the International Criminal Court. Most recently, the human security concept that lay behind this process also led to the inclusion of the idea of the “responsibility to protect” into the 2005 UN Summit final outcome document.

Actors and (Reasonable) Expectations

The actors that need to be considered include governments, civil society organizations (CSOs, including non-governmental organizations and parliamentary associations), the private sector and of course, the United Nations ‘system’ itself. This list seems simple enough, however important questions quickly arise. Is there an obvious leader or leaders from amongst these actors, and what sort of credentials and resources stand behind such claims to leadership? In the terms of the workshop title, should we look for a ‘new partnership’ that is to be undertaken between equal or comparable actors, or should we be thinking of a relationship between a menu of actors that are inevitably unequal or asymmetrical in their capabilities, interests and objectives? And if the latter is the case, (a) is there necessarily anything wrong about that and (b) what might be sought after and accomplished that is new, and presumably positive and constructive?

When it was presented in June 2004, the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations offered 30 proposals for consideration. The

Panel, chaired by former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was established by Secretary-General Annan in 2003 “to review the relationship between the United Nations and civil society and offer practical recommendations for improved modalities and interaction”. Some of the Panel’s recommendations were seen as useful but NGO critics nonetheless found many flaws. In particular, the notion of “networked governance” to be developed through a “multistakeholder” process was seen as little more than the transfer of influence to business interests and the weakening of the social, economic and political responsibilities and duties of national governments. In the end, these critics argued, that although it did set out a few potentially useful suggestions “The panel bases its’ thinking on a concept of the UN as a place for discussions, not a place for legislation or action. In this sense it proposes to weaken the UN and reduce its capacity to make rules, establish norms and act as a defender of international law.”¹

If the Cardoso Report was criticized as reflecting too much of the conservative, neoliberal paradigm putting big business forward as a ‘partner’ to the United Nations, a radical alternative vision is that advanced by the World Social Forum. Advocates of the WSF argue that the neoliberal model of sociopolitical order has created “the worst possible kind” of globalization that treats the majority of humanity “as discardable surplus.”² According to supporters of the WSF, this process has growing popular support – 10,000 participants at the first meeting in 2001, and over 150,000 at the 2005 meeting – as it seeks to create an alternative space in which diverse social movements can meet, share practices, develop networks and coordinate campaigns. Nonetheless, these same advocates acknowledge that the WSF “is not an organized movement” with a plan of action and has not created structural alternatives to what it sees as the mainstream model of global governance. This remains “a collective task for the long haul” in an undetermined time frame. Also, it is not self-evident that the WSF is any more qualified to claim the authority to speak on others’ behalf than, say, a collection of major corporations: the otherwise-impressive attendance at the 2005 Forum remains substantially lower than the electorate of even the smallest member states of the United Nations.

This last observation leads the analysis back to the title of the workshop and to the idea of reasonable expectations. In particular, NGOs as well as private sector businesses, should remain in a complementary but secondary role to the governments of member states at the United Nations. At least in comparison to governments in states with democratic political processes, neither NGOs nor businesses can claim the legitimacy of democratic elections. NGOs may bring with them expertise and experience in specific issue areas, and businesses may bring great financial and networking resources that would be otherwise unavailable to NGOs or even to many developing country governments. In neither case do these valuable assets render these actors more than self-appointed voices.

In the same way that the WSF advocates and the Global Policy Forum commentators expressed skepticism of the role of corporations in shaping public policy, it is worth questioning the use of the term ‘partnership’ when talking about relations between the United Nations *as a venue of expression of the will and interests of member*

¹ See “Comments on the Report of the Cardoso Panel”, by Jens Martens and James Paul of the Global Policy Forum.

² Candido Grzybowski, “The World Social Forum: Reinventing Global Politics”, *Global Governance* 12 (2006), pp.7-13.

states and either civil society actors or corporations. Partnership suggests a relationship of equality, or at least substitutability, that is not necessarily either appropriate or useful: “democratically elected Governments and Parliaments are the only actors that are legitimated to set global rules and standards and to take global decisions.”³

Out With The New, In With The (Relatively) Old

The title of this paper suggests that there is perhaps a single form of leadership, and that today we are searching for a new structure through which civil society can act upon, and have greater influence over, the UN system. Rather than advocating this understanding, I prefer to question it and to raise the possibility that a new or revised structure *per se* simply may not be either feasible or useful. It may be more helpful to think in terms of a process rather than a structure.

In the 1990s, then-Foreign Minister of Canada Lloyd Axworthy was at the centre of a series of vibrant global governance debates and initiatives that spawned the Anti-Personnel Landmines Ban treaty and the treaty establishing a Permanent International Criminal Court. There also was a flurry of international initiatives dealing with other topics within what had become “the human security agenda” such as the use of child soldiers, and the illicit trades in small arms and light weapons and ‘conflict diamonds’. In the face of sometimes-powerful political opposition, the so-called Ottawa Process achieved real progress in its agenda, including the two landmark international agreements noted above. In these instances, as the Minister recognized, NGOs and international humanitarian organizations (including UNICEF and the Red Cross) provided invaluable energy, expertise, credibility, commitment and when needed, political influence through lobbying national political figures. However, the convening power and political authority that was central to the success of the initiatives lay in the hands of the state – or more specifically, with the governments of what I have previously called “entrepreneurial middle powers” such as Canada, Norway and (Nelson Mandela’s) South Africa.

Axworthy notes that the UN system at times suffered from bloc political bargaining that could leave it paralysed, but that entrepreneurial middle power states in coordination with NGOs and international organizations could establish new policy networks that open up opportunities for progress. In the instances of the human security initiatives mentioned above, it was sufficient that NGOs and states cooperated alongside international humanitarian agencies. However, when dealing with global economic, social and environmental issues, the private sector must be included as businesses are – for good and bad reasons – central players. Taking the confrontational approach of seeing ‘big business’ as the root of all problems will not be helpful; and seeking a radical transformation of global economic relations likewise is perhaps too far-fetched to have practical merit. To this extent the Global Compact, despite its flaws⁴, may be one step in a positive direction. NGOs would be needed for their expertise and advocacy, and also (for the skeptics of big business) as sources of “adversarial review” in monitoring the behaviour of these corporate “good citizens”.

³ Martens and Paul, p.14.

⁴ See Vicente Garcia-Delgado, “Too Close for Comfort: Should Civil Society and the Global Compact Live Under the Same UN Roof?”, *CIVICUS* (September-October 2004).

In this vision, issue-oriented coalitions of states, NGOs, international agencies and the private sector work together to define policy platforms, mobilize resources and political support, and bring these to the UN where the world body of states can be the forum of final discussion. This need not entail a fundamental reorientation of roles, or a formalization of new institutional or bureaucratic structures. Indeed, these latter (Axworthy might suggest) would tend to congeal and lead to immobility or inflexibility. Instead, with states still in the lead role, and the United Nations as the ultimate forum, the strengths of an array of actors could be drawn upon to support positive global governance practices in a constantly changing global political environment.

CHAPTER 2

SHORT PAPERS BY THE ORGANIZERS

Some Reflections on the Leadership of the UN System

Takeo Uchida

Some Thoughts on Multi-Stakeholders and
the United Nations

Kazuo Takahashi

Corporate Accountability and UN Norms: Are We Moving
Towards a “Mecca” Pathway?

Mikoto Usui

Some Reflections on the Leadership of the UN System

By Takeo Uchida*

When we discuss leadership of the UN system and civil society, we need to disaggregate the loose but complex UN "system". First, we need to distinguish the UN as a political organization, from its technical and functional agencies. Secondly, we need to separate UN organs by their function and memberships: the General Assembly and the Security Council are consultative bodies of member states, whereas the Secretariat headed by the Secretary-General consists of international civil servants. Inis Claude Jr. called the former UN#2, and the latter UN#1.

This note focuses on the leadership role of UN#1 – the Secretariat - as it occupies a unique position in the UN. The Secretariat's mandate transcends national interests and boundaries (national interests are dealt with by UN#2). The Secretariat is expected to be a guardian of humanity's interests. It has a special duty to address global issues including poverty, conflicts, and environmental crises. As people in developing countries are affected most by these global problems, the UN Secretariat naturally tends to speak on behalf of these marginalized people. Given current geopolitical and economic realities of the world, UN#1 is often regarded by the more developed countries as agent of poorer countries and people. Oran Young once classified international leadership into three types: structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual. The UN system as a whole excels in entrepreneurial (negotiating capacity) and intellectual leadership, but provides little structural leadership backed by military, political and economic might. UN#1 has demonstrated during its 60-year history that it can exert intellectual and moral leadership by providing science-based analyses of global problématiques and projecting visions for developmental paths for humanity.

However, UN#1 alone cannot play an effective leadership role alone. It can do so only in collaboration with global epistemic communities and civil society, as well as with national policymakers and practitioners. The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and its report *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (December 2004), and the follow-up report by the Secretary-General *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (March 2005) show the value of close linkages between UN#1 and the global intellectual community to produce innovative approaches.

In addition, important linkage for the functioning of UN#1 is collaboration with global civil society, particularly with its organized non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The end of the cold war has opened significant space for NGOs to step into spaces left by the so-called retreat of the state. NGOs have rich experiences in the field and have earned considerable legitimacy through their work. Indeed, NGOs have become important partners for the UN's activities especially in the areas of development and human rights.

UN#1 derives its legitimacy as a moral and intellectual leader partly from the UN Charter itself (formal), and from the past achievements (substantive) of successive Secretaries-General. The Charter stipulates that UN#1 has to be staffed by people who

enjoy the highest standard of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Otherwise, as recent unfortunate cases revealed, the Secretariat cannot function as a leader in global society. UN#1 must continue to serve as a center for harmonizing the actions of various divergent actors, to find new and creative ways to address global problems. This may seem like a tall order, and it is, but it is one we cannot afford not to try to fulfill.

To the extent that the Secretary-General represents UN#1, he or she should be able to concentrate on “the political and policy dimensions of the Organization’s work” as Kofi Annan recently proposed in his report *Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide*. The Secretary-General should not be hindered by routine management issues of the Organization. Instead, the Secretary-General should be in a position to project a global vision and exert leadership to achieve the goals set by UN#2 and by broader global civil society. The development of a competent global civil service system, and the full development of the present international civil service, will be indispensable for UN#1 to meet the new challenges that it faces in today’s world.

* Professor of International Public Policy; Chuo University, Visiting Professor, UNU

Some Thoughts on “Multi-Stakeholders and the UN”

By Kazuo Takahashi*

Coalition of the Willing: An Approach to Re-activate the United Nations

Multilateralism assumes that an issue that is put before an international organization should be a concern of the entire membership of the institution. This proposition certainly has merit at the time when international society is characterized by a high degree of stability and when there is coherence in the interests among the structure of the international organization and the configuration of the power relationships among its members. Yet, even in such rather rare situations, the reality of the politics of multilateral institutions indicates that members tend to break up into interest groups and alliances.

In a world community characterized by rapid changes to its structure, to relationships among its members and to its priority concerns, one cannot assume that a policy matter of priority to one country is necessarily also a priority to other members of the organization. This is what is currently happening at the United Nations. It cannot be assumed that the civil war in Sri Lanka, for example, is a concern for countries in South America or in Africa. In this situation it is essential that those actors that have strong interests in Sri Lanka should find ways to cooperate, including partnerships with NGOs and business actors. Once a peace accord is reached, it is preferable that it is endorsed by the Security Council and/or the General Assembly. The United Nations fulfills the important function of providing legitimacy to an agreement.

In fact, most problem issues facing the world community are of this character. They require coalitions of the willing, in particular partnerships with civil society actors. However, it is equally important to use some unique functions of the United Nations such as legitimization to the maximum extent. This approach, in addition to a number of other possible measures - including the reform of the Security Council and streamlining the Secretariat so that the SG can play his/her diplomatic roles more freely by delegating a large part of the administrative functions to his/her deputy - will contribute significantly to revitalizing the United Nations.

Three Layers of the United Nations and the Multi-Stakeholders

The United Nations can be defined in various ways for different purposes. In order to conceptualize approaches to revitalize the United Nations, it is necessary to clearly understand three distinct layers of the United Nations and the specific roles attached to each layer. These layers are: Firstly, intergovernmental bodies such as the General Assembly and the Security Council. Secondly, the Secretariat of the United Nations and headquarters of its specialized organizations and operational programmes. And, thirdly, UN field offices.

The most influential among the three layers arguably are the field offices where morale tends to be high. The second most influential is the headquarters of the secretariats. The influence of the intergovernmental bodies is relatively smaller. For the

purpose of the re-vitalization of the United Nations, it is essential that the most influential layer, namely the field offices, should lead the way. The participation of the civil society and business actors, and cities and towns in the work of the United Nations should be promoted most vigorously at this layer. The current political obsession though appears to be related to the other two layers. In particular current discussion on organizational reform and certainly current budget allocations suggest the political focus is on reform in the intergovernmental bodies. I argue, however, that there are considerable gains in looking at the partnership work done among UN parts and civil society actors in field office. In other words, at the grass-roots. I would argue it is more fruitful to consider various best-practices cases of collaboration of UN field office and various non-state actors, and to devise a systemic effort to disperse insights gained in these multi-stakeholder processes to inform reform discussion at the global level. This argument to shift the focus to the field offices is arguably also strengthened by the fact that the UN's operational programmes are being expanded.

* Professor, International Christian University; Visiting Professor, UNU

Corporate Accountability and UN Norms: Are We Moving Towards a “Mecca” Pathway?

By Mikoto Usui*

In the current phase of “reflexive” globalization, the challenge of reintegrating business into civil society has become one of the most contentious public policy issues. While civil society activists keep calling for new legally binding instruments to regulate multinational corporations, the international business community has come to respond increasingly positively to the burgeoning buzz of corporate citizenship, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and corporate accountability.

CSR now looks like a small “Oasis” for a substantial number of business leaders. But CSR advocacy circles caution that it is unlikely to become a “Mecca” pathway for change – i.e. where the market rewards innovative business strategies for greater social and environmental accountability – unless it is supported by a more enabling public policy environment.¹ A similar feeling is expressed in the *Shanghai Declaration* of the UN Global Compact Summit (30 Nov.-1 Dec. 2005) which stresses the role of governments to promote mainstreaming Global Compact principles into corporate governance.

The post-Rio decade saw many CSR codes of international significance being established. These include intergovernmental initiatives such as the 2000 revision of the OECD *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises* and the UN “*Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights*” (the draft was adopted by the Sub-Commission in August 2003 after several years of stakeholder consultations), along with a large number of private “multi-stakeholder” codes following direct consultation and engagement among business corporations and public-interest NGOs. All these codes and guidelines embrace basically comparable ethical norms, but given their individual “voluntaristic” nature, the differences in terms of procedural details and sector-specific requirements mean they are not easily consolidated and standardized in multinational and multi-sectoral contexts. Also, the voluntary nature of adherence to these codes remains difficult to manage. Given these circumstances, “complaint-based mechanisms” have come to attract increasing attention, with a focus on how to address specific instances of corporate (and state) violation of agreed norms. Generally speaking, civil society actors seem to be able to exert greater influence on business by “confronting” business with “naming and shaming” tactics, than by “engaging” business for collaborative problem-solving ventures². The UN Human Rights Commission has long utilized complaints-based

* Professor, Seisa University and Visiting Professor, UNU-IAS

¹ J. Sabapathy and S. Zadek, “Responsibility Competitiveness”, *Accountability Forum 1*, Greenleaf Publishing & AccountAbility, Feb. 2004.

² While optimistic rhetoric abound about business-NGO “partnerships”, skeptics warn that many of such partnerships occur out of “momentary coincidences” of the parties’ different interests that do not automatically warrant sharing a common enduring long-term goal. A shallow alliance can be little different from conventional philanthropy. With a longer-term engagement, NGOs may risk their legitimacy and businesses risk wasting resources.

mechanisms to deal officially with cases of violation.

While the UN Global Compact (GC) complements other CSR initiatives and promotes open dialogue on business-society relationships, it is not a standard, nor a code. From the outset it has remained aloof from the notion of regulatory arrangement. It is lenient about monitoring and penalizing non-performing signatories. Critics regard this, coupled with the lack of governmental involvement in its governance, as reason for the GC's rather weak political legitimacy in the intergovernmental context. However, recently, an interesting inter-meshing has been taken place between the GC Office and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

By the time the GC Advisory Council recommended (in July 2003) addressing the misuse and abuse of the GC logo, the "Business Leaders Initiatives on Human Rights (BLIHR)"³ led by Mary Robinson (former High Commissioner for HR), volunteered to work out a "Guide for Integrating Human Rights into Business Management". The draft Guide acquired the status of joint report with the GCO and the OHCHR by Dec. 2005. Furthermore, in the process of following up on the draft "Norms", the HR Commission authorized the Secretary-General to appoint Prof. John Ruggie as his *Special Representative* on Business and Human Rights in April 2005, with the mandate of "identifying and clarifying standards of corporate responsibility and accountability" in cooperation with the newly-appointed Special Representative on the GC (Prof. Klaus Leisinger).⁴ The GC Office's proposal, "the Global Compact's Next Phase", was endorsed by the SG (in August 2005). The proposal retained the GC's voluntary and network-based character but contained a new element, namely "Integrity Measures"⁵ that adopt a complaint-based system for protecting the GC name and logo from misuse. This is, hopefully, a sign of the growing move toward deeper institutionalization of corporate responsibility and accountability at the international level.

Against this background the GC initiative appeared to enjoy broadened formal political support during the 2005 World Summit, and the General Assembly unanimously adopted the Resolution "Towards Global Partnerships" on 15 December 2005. This Resolution gives stronger legitimacy to the GC and its future work.

³ The 10 member companies of this 3-year project includes National Grid Transco plc, Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development, Novo Nordisk A/S, the Body Shop International plc, ABB Ltd, etc.). See www.blihr.org/

⁴ Prof. Ruggie used to serve as Special Advisor to the SG on the Global Compact until the beginning of 2005). And Prof. Leisinger was CEO and President of Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development - a leading member of the BLIHR mentioned in n.2 above.

⁵ The GC Office is to use its own good offices to encourage resolution of registered complaints, and share with the parties information about the "specific instance" procedures of the OECD *Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises* and the interpretation procedure under the ILO *Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy*, as appropriate.

CHAPTER 3

COMMENTS BY INVITED SCHOLARS

Questions for Consideration

Martha Cottam

Questions and Comments for Consideration

Otwin Marenin

Influence of Civil Society on Foreign Policy

Wilhelm Vosse

NGOs and Social Movements: Friends or Foes?

T.V. Reed

Imagining a Second UN General Assembly: VOW (Voice of the World and/or "Solemn Promise")

Jacqueline Wasilewski

Questions for Consideration

By Martha Cottam*

1. Should the assumption that development strategies (ranging from traditional economic programs, to poverty reduction strategies, to institutional and democratization reforms) are useful before conflicts occur, and security strategies are useful during and after conflict be challenged? Can both strategies, or components of each, be used simultaneously?

2. What kind of incentives can be offered to encourage non-state actors and social movements to participate in reforms of the UN? How receptive is the UN to their participation, and through which channels is it encouraged, if at all? Is the inclusion of non-state actors and social movements in the UN reform likely to enhance UN legitimacy? How are member governments likely to respond to their inclusion?

3. How successful has the Framework for Coordination been and how is this success measured?

4. What is the reform process and how does it relate to civil society? Who is driving the reform process? Are there different perspectives on necessary reforms emanating from developing countries and/or the General Assembly compared to those from the Security Council's permanent members?

5. One of the central and early issues in the consideration of civil society was the landmine issue. What role did the United Nations play in that movement? Did some members try to blunt the Ottawa Process? If so, which countries opposed it and why?

* Professor, Department of Political Science/Program in Criminal Justice, Washington State University

Questions and Comments for Consideration

By Otwin Marenin*

As I understand it, the goal of the trilateral research project is to identify concrete mechanisms by which CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) and PSOs (Private Sector Organizations) can work together to promote reform of the UN which will be of practical benefits to both types of organizations.

1. What aspects/elements of the UN are reforms focused on and are those aspects the ones CSOs and PSOs, rather than states, are likely to be able to influence? It is not clear to me what the target is that is to be reformed.

For example UN reforms can be at the HQ in New York or of affiliated functional organizations, or of UN associated research institutions, such as United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). I would think that CSOs and PSOs are more likely to have an impact on the workings of affiliated and associated organizations than of the HQ, largely because much of the work of the affiliates is done in cooperation with civil society and private organizations already.

If that argument makes sense, then CSOs and PSOs should focus their efforts on their areas of functional specializations in the UN; and seek to affect HQ reforms by influencing their states' government rather than the reform process at the UN.

2. Much of what one reads in the media on UN and the need for reforms deal with the stultifying bureaucracy and the endless political bickering that goes on in the General Assembly and the Security Council. Of course, the bickering reflects state interests as expressed by the administrations in power.

To what degree do those concerns really have an impact on the ability of CSOs and PSOs to do the work they are engaged in? One could argue, that CSOs and PSOs should not be concerned with reform of the UN generally, but in those areas of UN activity which have an impact on the work of these organizations. Therefore, what are the real obstacles the UN poses to the work of CSOs and PSOs?

3. Through the research I do I am familiar with certain kinds of CSOs and PSOs, namely those involved in the security sector and its reform and in peacebuilding generally. For most of these organizations (human rights, police reform, anti-mining, etc.) The UN is not the major problem for their work. It is the lack of coordination among donors and the overlaps in sponsored activities among donors and implementing organizations. Plus, in many cases, civic society groups are not seen by state and regional/international actors as legitimate or having a place in the implementation of the programs.

What reforms of the UN would help alleviate these problems, which I am sure also exist in other functional areas? Or more generally, what are the basic problems for CSOs and PSOs in working with the UN, hence what needs to be reformed?

4. The message mentions that CSOs and PSOs do not always see eye to eye, they have different agendas on global governance. Does this mean they would like the UN to be doing different policies than it is doing now; or does that mean the CSOs and PSOs have different perceptions of what is good for global governance and how the UN would fit into their preferred global governance architecture? Are we talking about the UN as a global governor or about the whole international governance architecture (financial, economic, environmental, etc) on how the globalization effects of technology and other changes should be guided toward a greater global good?

5. If the two types of non-state organizations have different agendas and hopes, what would it take for them to agree on a common agenda which then, once achieved, could provide the foundation for cooperative efforts seeking UN reform? Is it possible to find areas of agreement and what would these be?

6. Lastly, what are the goals of the sponsoring organization for this conference? For example, I am unclear what the notion of international governance innovation is or seeks to achieve, and how that fits with reform of the UN System? Do the sponsoring organizations have compatible goals, and similar priorities among these goals?

* Professor, Criminal Justice in the Department of Political Science/Criminal Justice Program, Washington State University

Influence of Civil Society on Foreign Policy

By Wilhelm Vosse*

It is widely believed that the majority of citizens are only marginally interested in foreign policy questions and that social and economic factors are significantly more important in explaining voting behavior and political allegiance. The realist and liberalist schools in international relations theory both assume that the international order predominantly consists of states as their main actors. State governments and leaders have to respond to the international system and its requirements, and cannot and should not take into account sub-state actors or public opinion. Although liberalists think that the economic interests and its representatives on the sub-state (local businesses) and global level (MNCs) can influence the debate and the positions of state actors, they agree with realists that eventually, governments have to make decisions considering national security in the broadest sense.

When we consider political discourse at the national level, in most Western democracies political parties distinguish themselves from others based on ideology and socio-economic approaches. On specific issues, such as the degree of cooperation with a military ally, political parties tend to have slightly different view, but broadly speaking in most European countries and also in Japan, there seems to be general consensus about foreign policy issues – at least as far as their representatives in the respective parliaments are concerned.

However, surveys of public opinion on foreign and security policy reveal that many respondents have a far more complex set of preferences. Examples are surveys conducted by the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations and the Pew Foundation. Similarly, a survey that a team of ICU and WSU political scientists conducted in late 2004 (SAGE 2004) illustrated that many citizens in Japan and the US are quite knowledgeable and concerned about a number of international issues. However, the diversity of opinion not mirrored in political party preferences, indicates that given the chance many citizens would like to debate foreign policy issues with each other and would also like to be heard by their government. Although the Japanese government has a system of advisory committees where experts and representatives of social movements are heard about upcoming policy decisions, this is mostly limited to issues that have a direct impact on the citizens concerned, such as pollution, education, or social welfare. Questions that have foreign policy implications such as military cooperation or interventions are decided with no or very little debate and input from citizens and social movements. The recent debate about the relocation of US military forces and the referendum (non-binding) in Iwakuni are the exception rather than the rule. Current debates about Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution reveal a high level of concern about Japan's future military role and image in the world, and the need for a broader public debate on the matter.

Generally speaking, we have democratic control of government decision through debates and elections at the national level. At this level, we have stakeholders for a variety of interests: from trade unions to employers associations, from representatives of the poor to those of the rich, of men and women, liberalists to conservatives, from

young to old. Basically, government decisions, broadly speaking, are a reflection of the positions held in that particular society.

However, at the level of regional IGOs and international IGOs, we have long seen a so-called *democracy deficit*. On these levels, governments are supposed to represent interests of nations; hence nations are represented only as unit actors. The diverse debate at the societal level is not reflected at the regional or global level. Therefore, many citizens consider the European Union (EU) and its institutions, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the World Bank, as outside the reach of national societies.

Over the past decades, citizens have begun to organize a global debate about issues of global concern. The peace movement of the 1960s and 1980s could be considered a first attempt in not only influencing decisions of national governments in Europe and North America, but were also first examples of a international discourse and exchange between Western and Eastern European citizens' groups, beyond and above the state level. More recent example are the World Social Forum (WSF) and the global justice movement.

A reform of international organizations, and especially the United Nations, needs to include a mechanism to involve representative groups and individuals that are not represented by state governments. The recent establishment the UN Peacebuilding Commission is an example of how not to continue going about creating international governance institutions. The Commission does not take the broad range of actors into account. Only 31 countries are represented in its decision-making council, including all five permanent members and the largest donor countries. Hence, OECD countries are again at the center. Yet, peace and security, along with the environment are issues that go beyond national boundaries and hence national interests.

Overall, we should gradually move away from states as the units of representation in such bodies. How to structure the new bodies is the key question we need to consider: First ideas towards this type of discussion include proposals to form a system where representatives are independently elected by a certain number of people. we could consider adding a second chamber to the UN General Assembly. If the current General Assembly could be compared to the US Senate, then a second chamber could represent the people of the world. Members of this chamber could, for example, be elected on a quota formula of one person for every 10-30 million people.

* Assistant Professor of ICU

NGOs and Social Movements: Friends or Foes?

By T.V. Reed*

My area of expertise is social movements, so naturally my contributions will be about how movements might be imagined in relation to this worthy project. In particular, I am interested in connections and differences between social movements and their close siblings, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). My large questions are two: What relations typically exist between movement groups and NGOs? And what ideal, or at least more effective, relations might there be between movements and NGOs?

The first question gets us immediately into the problem of definitions. I am happy to assert that movements – or at least movement groups – and NGOs, overlap, and become one and the same in certain conditions. We could say that the more stable and bureaucratic social movement groups are indistinguishable from NGOs, or that certain very activist-oriented NGOs are indistinguishable from movement groups. Nevertheless, I would insist that it is often useful to distinguish between the two in the following ways. While both entity types function in civil society, the goal of NGOs is largely to supplement and/or lobby the state, while the goal of movements is to disrupt and dramatize the inadequacies of the state (or other entities).

Social movements as purveyors of unauthorized, unofficial, anti-institutional, collective action by ordinary citizens face fewer constraints than NGOs. One of the foremost scholars of social movements, Charles Tilly, argues convincingly that the key value of movements lies in their “repeated public displays” of alternative political and cultural values by acting outside of officially sanctioned channels. Movements, in contrast to their tamer, more institutionalized siblings – political parties, lobbyists, and NGOs – seek to bring about social change primarily through this medium of dramatic action. At their most efficacious, such dramatic actions have brought down governments, at their least efficacious, they become little more than juvenile displays of frustration.

The term NGO, of course, encompasses an incredibly wide variety ideologically, and in terms of focus, from far left to moderate, from environmental to human rights to women’s to health advocacy and so on. Some NGOs are more service-oriented, others lobby to affect policy, and, as I suggested, still others are virtually indistinguishable from direct action social movement groups. Direct actionists tend to see NGOs as more moderate and formal, if not bureaucratic, and NGOs tend to see direct actionists as disorganized and overly confrontational. Each tends to stereotype the other in unproductive ways.

Which leads to my second question, What *should* be the relation between movements and NGOs? In general, NGOs form a mediating space between formal governments and the disruptive power of direct actionists. In an overall strategy of “alternative globalization,” the two sectors often benefit each other, with NGOs proposing much-needed temporary reforms while the direct actionists push for deeper transformations. But this mutual benefit is not often felt or acknowledged by partisans of these respective modes of political engagement. The prime danger of movements is

that when the gap between their radical ideals and the always-disappointing reality grows too wide, violence and even terrorism rise in the place of non-violent direct action. Conversely, the danger of NGOs is that they will bolster indifferent or repressive states by doing ameliorative work that inadvertently perpetuates rather than solves the problem. NGOs are often better at dealing with the immediate needs of people in real distress, while movements are generally better at raising systemic questions out of the reach of poorly funded ameliorative organizations. Working in tandem, rather than as opponents, would make an extremely powerful context of the kinds of changes toward greater justice, equity, and peace we all desire.

* Professor of English and Director of American Studies at Washington State University

Imagining a Second UN General Assembly: VOW (Voice of the World and/or “Solemn Promise”)

By Jacqueline Wasilewski*

Over the past two decades I have been involved with the creation of social spaces where diverse participants can all be themselves together and collectively address the complex problems which we human beings face at this time in history. Much of this work has been done with indigenous people around the world, along with people from their respective mainstream societies working on various governance, leadership and education issues that have affected indigenous communities.

As a part of this work we have experimented with various dialogic processes, ranging from highly structured, consensus-constructing, computer-assisted processes for complex problem-solving (Christakis and Bausch, 2006; L. Harris and Wasilewski, 2004; L. D. Harris and Wasilewski, 2004; Wasilewski, 1997) to very unstructured, open processes (Bohm, 1996). Most recently, with Center of Excellence funding, I have organized two dialogues that have brought together people from North East Asia to discuss issues facing their region (Wasilewski, 2005; 2006) (see Handout I).

In organizing such dialogues stakeholder identification is of utmost importance. In one graduate class on International Conference Management Professor Kunugi and I set the task for students to design an imaginary "Second" UN General Assembly of civil society actors to complement the existing General Assembly of state actors.

The students used the computer-assisted structured dialogue process mentioned above (Christakis and Bausch, 2006) to address the question of who should be included. They had to think about what constituencies there are in the world at the beginning of the 21st century, what categories of participants should participate, and who needs to be involved in the implementation of any solutions to the world's problems.

Before beginning to identify specific participants the students determined that they needed to include both **issue actors** and **identity actors** to be able to realize “demosophia,” the wisdom of the people referred to by Christakis (1996). They identified three broad categories of actors that would need to be included: **representative actors**, **idea actors** and **process actors**. They also thought there should be a balance of **non-formal and formal actors** dealing with the same issue, and at certain times **both** state and non-state actors should be in the same venue in order for them to work together. Eventually, the students identified eight categories of participants (see Handout II), including groups in conflict with governments.

In thinking about how the 800 seats in UN Headquarters in New York should be allocated among the eight categories, they also thought about how to use the internet and video conferencing to enhance the functioning of the Second Assembly. Thus, they came up with the idea of “real” vs. “virtual” seats and how to allocate them (see Handout II).

Three items they did not have time to address were rules of procedure, decision rules and the use of the internet, before, during and after meetings.

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* Professor of Intercultural Communication, International Christian University

HANDOUT I: The ICU-COE North East Asian Dialogue Project

In February 2005 the first Northeast Asian Boundary-Spanning Dialogue Project brought together Japanese, Chinese, Korean and Russian students and civil society members to identify major obstacles to intercultural communication in Northeast Asia, one of which was the issue of contested history. In February of 2006 a second Dialogue took place which began to map out the historical territory of the Northeast Asian region as a whole. We realized last year was that participants were usually familiar with some dyadic issues (like those between, for instance, Japan and China), but few participants had a comprehensive awareness of the history of the region as a whole. It is this comprehensive historical terrain that we began “to map” this year. We also wanted to include, not only the master narratives of the nation-states of the region, but also the “hidden” narratives of the different groups of people making up each nation-state, including the Buryat, Evenki and Khanmigan people in Russia, of Ainu and Okinawans in Japan, of Korean-Chinese, etc.

This year the 36 participants divided into four Dialogue Circles - each representative of the diversity of the overall group. Each Circle contributed twenty-minute historical narratives generated from their specific personal socio-cultural-historical points of view. The participants in other Circles had an opportunity to ask clarifying questions about the narrative. All the narratives were video-taped, and are being archived (eventually with translations of the texts into five languages - Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Russian and English) on a website that accompanies this project and is being developed by students at Kwansai Gakuin University.

The aim of this Project is to create both face-to-face and virtual spaces where all the peoples of the Northeast Asian Region may continue to encounter each other in mutually supportive environments. It is hoped that this will provide a basis for transforming and transcending challenging issues, both historical and contemporary, and that such Dialogues may eventually lead to an international day of reconciliation. Under the present funding two more dialogue activities will be undertaken.

**HANDOUT II: A Second General Assembly
Participation Categories and Allocation of Real & Virtual Seats**

PARTICIPATION CATEGORIES

Category I:


Minority/subordinated groups

Any group (mostly NGOs) that advocates and enhances the voices of people who do not have enough power/opportunity to be heard.

Grassroots women’s organizations, senior group representatives, youth group representatives, gays & lesbian identity advocates, disabled people and so forth.

Category II:

In this category, in particular, there seem to be three kinds of actors – representative, idea and process actors.



Category III:

International NGOs (NGOs working in many [at least 3] countries)

For example:

Children's rights activists

NGOs for prevention and control of illicit trade in arms, drugs and human trafficking

Disarmament advocates regarding small & large arms, including land mines and weapons of mass destruction

Note: about 18,000 in all

Non-state actors in consultative relationship with ECOSOC, including international NGOs, international labor unions/federations, International Chamber of Commerce

Note: about 1,500 in all

Category IV:

IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union) and National Legislatures, as distinct from the Executive Branch of Government

Category V:

IULA (International Union of Local Autonomies), local governments/authorities and community-based organizations

Category VI:

TNCs (because of their impact on world affairs)

Small and medium-size businesses (because they form an overwhelming majority of the businesses)

Category VII:

Groups in conflict with governments,

including rebels and organized social campaigns against existing regimes

ALLOCATION OF REAL & VIRTUAL SEATS

1. Seat allocation to be made depending on the priority agenda of the Second Assembly of each session
2. Assembly seats should, in principle, be assigned in inverse proportion to the wealth and resources that groups/people control.

3. Accountability of Assembly representatives not only to the groups they represent but also to the global interest of the humanity.
4. Combination of face-to-face and virtual, including live video conferencing; use of recorded video for those who are unable to participate at the time of the Assembly.
5. Using technologies to enhance overlapping meetings of the General Assembly and the Second Assembly as a step towards global e-governance.
6. Create INTERNET ISSUE SITES open to public debate with an objective review report on the opinions regularly posted.
7. Collect people's ideas and opinions via the internet and offer them as reference data for governmental deliberations.
8. ISSUE COMMITTEES to function as participatory theaters by combining face-to-face and video conferencing.

CHAPTER 4

COMMENTS BY INVITED EXPERTS AND PRACTITIONERS

UN Reform and Civil Society

Wakako Hironaka

—

Enhancing the Role of the Diet Members and NGOs in Foreign Policy Making

Yukihisa Fujita

—

Canadian UN Policy Development with Civil Society

David Drake

—

UN Reform and Institutional Governance

Sumihiro Kuyama

—

The UN Secretariat and the International Civil Service

Momoyo Ise

—

Employment as a Global Issue

Shinichi Hasegawa

—

UN Partnerships with Business and Civil Society – Opportunities and Challenges for the Global Compact

Akio Nomura

Observations on the Global Compact

Susumu Nakamaru

Public-Private Partnerships to Fight Malaria

Yasushi Katsuma

Non-State Actors' Participation in Multilateral Environmental
Agreements

Masanori Kobayashi

GPPAC – Civil Society Seeks a New Multilateralism for
Peace

Akira Kawasaki

Some Reflections on NGOs' Participation in the
Decision-Making Process at the UN

Mikiko Otani

The Public Forum in Japan for Accountable UN Reform –
NGOs' Input

Kiyotaka Takahashi

Bottom-up Perspective – Local Agenda 21 Process
in Sweden

Midori Okabe

The Significance of a US-Canada-Japan Trilateral Research
on UN Reform

Kunio Katakura

Japan's Interest in UN Reform for Human Welfare

Yoshio Takano

UN Reform and Civil Society

By Wakako Hironaka*

This year marks the 50th anniversary of Japan joining the United Nations. In the past 50 years Japan has adopted a UN-centered foreign policy. Ever since Japan joined, the number of UN member states has quadrupled and the world has become increasingly linked through globalization. Our world is also facing increasing global problems such as inequality, environmental degradation, and terrorism. To address these problems more effectively partnership with state and non-state actors is imperative.

In my view, the UN remains the only appropriate mechanism to address these challenges. The UN and ECOSOC in particular have made important contributions to world peace, education, health, gender equality, minority issues and the environment. I am also continually impressed by the creativity and enthusiasm that surrounds specific UN years, such as the International Year of Volunteers. However, although I far from agree with Ambassador John Bolton, the UN has become too bureaucratic. Too much effort is invested in holding conferences and talking amongst each other, rather than putting its resources to action. I believe we can all agree that a drastic reform is necessary to increase efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and the democratic nature of the UN system.

As a parliamentarian, I would like to emphasize in particular the need for UN reform from an accountability perspective, namely, accountability to the Japanese people who are the source of Japan's financial contributions to the UN. As a member state, Japan has been a significant financial contributor, and though it is true that Japan is still far from meeting the ODA target of 0.7% GNI, we have contributed about 20% of the annual UN budget for the past ten years. We are also the largest donor towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We have also increasingly engaged in active cooperation, including emergency humanitarian assistance; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); and the removal of landmines. The issue of financial obligation and decision-making authority brings to mind the problem of "taxation without representation." Of course, accountable ODA policy has also been a domestic concern, but with the leadership of Ogata Sadako and many others, I believe Japan is improving.

The issue of Security Council reform has been on the agenda since the 1960s, and though the recent establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council are positive developments, true change requires reform of the Security Council. The unrepresentative nature of the Security Council, in other words, the overwhelming influence of the five members, has obstructed efforts to address both UN reform and global problems, especially with regards to disarmament and the environment. And in terms of the environment, with the rapid depletion of resources, we urgently need a more democratic forum to address the impact of environmental crises on national and human security, health, human rights, and global fairness.

Why do we need a new partnership between the UN system and global civil society? Civil society actors, namely NGOs, corporations, and local community groups,

have always remained the ones ultimately responsible for implementing UN initiatives. But with the advancement in communication and transportation, as well as the increasing complexity of issues, civil society actors have also become the true field experts in knowing what is required for a particular situation. Although there are currently 2719 NGOs with consultative status at ECOSOC and many UN decisions are made in consultation with civil society, it is far from adequate.

One obvious example of this was the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, organized under the leadership of Maurice Strong. A strong advocate of civil society, Strong invited thousands of environmental civil society groups, and as a result, over 25,000 individuals representing a total of 11,000 groups and 170 countries participated in the Summit, setting a precedent for the continued involvement of civil society in subsequent UN conferences. At the Summit, Strong intended to begin negotiations on an Earth – a statement of principles designed to guide the behavior of people and nations towards the Earth and towards each other. This vision of a universal environmental Charter was building on the recommendation of the Brundtland Commission and the result of extensive consultations with civil society actors around the globe.

Unfortunately, the world leaders at the Summit refused to adopt the proposed Charter, for reasons of national interest. Strong said at the time: “Why, if we know so much more about the nature and extent of the problems we face, and if we clearly have the capacity to implement the measures required to make the transition to sustainable development, are we still not doing it on the scale required?” At that time, Strong and many others including Mikhail Gorbachev and Ruud Lubbers, then Prime Minister of the Netherlands, concluded that implementation requires the motivation of people, which will lead to the political will of their governments. After the Summit, Strong and many others, including myself, undertook a process of drafting a people’s Charter. After completion of the draft, inclusive consultations took place throughout the world, and in June of 2000, the Earth Charter was formally launched at the Peace Palace in The Hague. Although the Charter has yet to be adopted by the UN, it has been endorsed by thousands of individuals, organizations, and communities who have recognized the need for a worldwide transition to sustainable development.

The legitimacy of civil society actors rests on the universality of its message and the international scale of the movement. It is undeniable that these actors can and do give voice to segments of the world population that are not necessarily represented by governments. To ensure a just and sustainable future, I believe it is absolutely necessary to strengthen the partnership between the UN and global civil society.

* Member of the House of Councilors, Vice-President, Democratic Party; former Environment Minister

Enhancing the Role of the Diet Members and NGOs in Foreign Policy Making

By Yukihiisa Fujita*

My NGO backgrounds

Having come from two international NGO backgrounds and having served as a Member of the House of Representatives for about 10 years, I would like to emphasize a couple of points regarding the important roles of the Diet and NGOs in foreign policymaking.

I have long been associated with an international NGO called Moral Re-Armament (MRA) which tries to bring reconciliation between opposing groups and nations. It helped post-war Franco-German reconciliation, the peaceful transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, and the post-war re-engagement of Japan in the international community. I was personally involved with confidence-building and democracy promotion in Cambodia. I was also one of the founding members of the Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), the first Japanese NGO to help refugees since 1979. I initiated AAR projects in Cambodia, Zambia, Zimbabwe and a couple of other countries.

Second track approach of parliamentarians

After being elected to the Diet, the first thing I did was to organize a “second track” campaign of parliamentarians and NGOs to persuade the Japanese Government to sign the Ottawa Treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines. With the support of 385 parliamentarians signing the petition, as well as the support of NGOs, the media and a number of diplomats stationed in Tokyo, we urged the Japanese Government to join the Ottawa Treaty by stressing the humanitarian aspect of the issue. Indeed, the Government decided to join it a few days before it was signed by more than 120 countries in December 1997. Another successful example of “second track” diplomacy was us parliamentarians joining NGOs to encourage the G8 countries at the Okinawa Summit to support the Jubilee 2000 initiative. This led to major reduction of debts and eventual cancellation of debts of most severely affected African countries.

Some impediments in Japan’s foreign policy making

By working in NGOs and in parliamentary politics, I found several impediments to making input into Japan’s foreign policymaking and the monitoring of its implementation, such as the allocation of foreign aid and other international cooperation initiatives. These impediments include:

First, there are few coordinated efforts among the government, Diet members and NGOs in the field of emergency assistance and economic development cooperation.

Secondly, government contributions to development and disaster relief has gone mostly to the governments of the recipient countries and very little directly to the people through Japanese NGOs.

Thirdly, unlike in other Western countries, there are practically no public funds or foundations established by the Diet or political parties to promote democracy and conflict resolution in developing countries.

Enhancing the role of elected officials and NGOs

A new international consensus has emerged that strengthening democratic institutions and promoting good governance are essential to sustainable peace and development. Parliamentarians and other elected officials in local government together with NGOs form important segments of civil society all over the world. Constructing a transparent second track structure with their engagement at the core will contribute not only to progressive foreign policy development but also create a new diplomacy for democratic governance.

*Vice Director-General, International Department, Democratic Party of Japan, Former Member, House of Representatives (1996-2000, 2003-2005)

Canadian UN Policy Development with Civil Society

By David Drake*

Note: Canada's new government was elected on January 23, 2005, and Parliament will return on April 3rd, 2006. Canada's Foreign Minister, Hon. Peter MacKay, met with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, as well as UN General Assembly President Jan Eliasson and UN Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette in New York on March 10, 2006. At that time, he stated that "Canada is ready to continue to play an important role through the UN and through our efforts and engagements around the world." The new government will issue its main policy statement, the Speech from the Throne, on April 4, 2006. Therefore, please note that the following views, which I have drawn from previous Canadian government public statements, do not necessarily represent official policy of the Government of Canada.

Canada has consistently been a principal advocate of more open and transparent UN processes, with broader and more significant participation by civil society. In this context, Canada strongly supported the recommendations of the Cardoso Panel on the UN and Civil Society (June 2004). Canada, together with Australia and New Zealand registered that:

“As civil society organisations have grown in their scope and responsibilities at the global and local levels they have become ever more important actors, possessing expertise, enthusiasm and networks across the global agenda. Participation by NGOs in inter-governmental processes can lead to better decisions, better outreach and more effective implementation. And collaboration with NGOs on the ground is essential for achieving our collective goals in development, humanitarian assistance and peace and security. (Canada) therefore agrees wholeheartedly with the Secretary-General that the United Nations and its major organs will benefit from interacting more extensively with civil society.”

Civil society organizations bring to the table additional information and different points of view on issues, which can help inform the decision-making of UN bodies. Civil society is important *inter alia* in:

- **Revitalizing the UNGA:** Without detracting from the fundamental, inter-governmental character of the General Assembly, a greater dialogue with NGOs in formal and informal settings would be of value. Canada supported the recommendation of the High-Level Panel that the General Assembly establish a better mechanism for engagement with civil society. This should include devising original formulas for interactive discussions with the participation of representatives of civil society;
- **Human rights:** Establishing an effective and credible Human Rights Council, one that provides for the specific input and participation of civil society groups;

- **Peacebuilding:** The involvement of local actors in the policy making process and a fruitful relation with civil society are among the priorities of today's post-conflict strategies. In particular, contributions from civil society are crucial to the long term success of peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts. Also, involvement of civil society in the international scrutiny of conflict areas can help avoid escalation of violations of human rights;
- **Development:** Full partnership with civil society and the private sector will be important in order to harness the innovation, resources and capacity necessary to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Achievement of the MDGs requires coherent implementation with a coordinating follow up by ECOSOC, as well as a comprehensive convergence of efforts between the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Trade Organization and other relevant actors, including civil society and the private sector;
- **Management of natural resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict:** The High-Level Panel recommended that the United Nations work with national authorities, international financial institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to develop norms governing the management of natural resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict. This is an area in which the efforts of Canada and others to establish and implement the Kimberley Process for rough diamonds has had credibility and impact and has demonstrated that progress is achievable;
- **Various UN processes** such as:

The work of ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies as well as UN Specialized Agencies and other UN bodies;

The Commission on Sustainable Development. The UNCSD has long been recognized as being at the cutting edge of civil society involvement in the UN System, which Canada has strongly supported;

UN conferences. One such example was the November 2005 World Summit on the Information Society, where Canada led the push for the involvement of civil society and the private sector, as key partners in the information society, in all plenary meetings and working groups during the prepcom process and at the two phases of the Summit itself.

In addition to promoting the involvement of civil society in UN processes, Canada actively seeks to involve civil society in the determination of Canada's positions in major UN meetings. The Canadian government also includes civil society representatives in its delegations to UN meetings. Virtually all Canadian delegations to meetings of major UN processes include a significant and varied component of civil society representatives from various NGOs and the private sector, as well as representatives from Canada's First Nations and provincial and territorial governments, as appropriate to the nature of each meeting.

* Minister-Counsellor (Political-Economic), Embassy of Canada, Tokyo

UN Reform and Institutional Governance

By Sumihiro Kuyama*

“A capable and effective Secretariat is indispensable to the work of the United Nations.---“ (para.184). “Those with the powers to make decisions – essentially the General Assembly --- must take care, when they assign mandates to the Secretariat, that they also provide resources adequate for the task. In return, management must be made more accountable and the capacity of intergovernmental bodies to oversee it must be strengthened.--- Member States must have oversight tools that they need to hold the Secretary-General truly accountable for his/her strategy and leadership” (para 186)

(Kofi Annan’s report, “In Larger Freedom”)

Introduction

Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN organizations is considered a precondition for partnership between the UN organizations and other actors in meeting the global challenges of the 21st century. In the context of enhancing UN’s efficiency and effectiveness, Member States, the Secretariat, and the UN’s oversight mechanisms should have a shared responsibility. In other words, the functions of Member States, the Secretariat, and the oversight mechanisms should be mutually reinforced in the sense that:

- (a) Member States (legislative organs) are responsible for governance mainly through setting and authorizing policies, as well as by overseeing whether resources made available are efficiently and effectively applied in the management and implementation by the Secretariat to achieve given policy directives;
- (b) the Secretariat is responsible for managing programmes, and human and financial resources within the overall framework of the legislative mandates etc., in addition to proposing policy initiatives which usually become the basis for policy directives by the legislative organs;
- (c) the Oversight mechanisms (in particular the external ones), being accountable to the Member States, are supposed to facilitate governance oversight by monitoring activities and reporting to the legislative organs on programme performance.

Issues for Review and Action

Based on the close interlinkages between the functions of the Member States (legislative organs), Secretariat, and Oversight mechanisms as mentioned above, UN reform to enhance institutional efficiency and effectiveness should be conducted by reviewing first the current state of affairs (problems/deficiencies) and then taking action for reform (improvement) on the following cluster of issues:

- a) the governance structure and arrangement, and the working methods and practices of Member States (legislative organs);
- b) the Secretariat's initiatives on policy formulation, management of programmes, management of human and financial resources, and reporting (accountability) to the legislative organs on the performance of programmes; and
- c) the Oversight mechanisms' measurement of performance, the methodologies for performance auditing, feedback of oversight findings for improving policies and programmes.

* Former President, Joint Inspection Unit of the UN System, and Deputy Executive Director, UN Habitat

The UN Secretariat and the International Civil Service

By Momoyo Ise*

The Associated Press (AP) reported in early March that the UN Staff Union handed Secretary-General Kofi Annan an overwhelming vote of no-confidence over his plans to overhaul UN operations. The direct cause of this action by the Union was a number of proposals contained in the Secretary General's report to the General Assembly on the reform of the Secretariat. The AP article further reported the Union position as follows: "the disappearance of permanent appointments and a new policy on job mobility without job security implied a fundamental attack against the international civil service."

Before reaching any definite conclusion, the document will have to be examined directly in detail. On the face of it though this news points to the urgent necessity to rethink the meaning of the Secretariat and the International Civil Service in relation to the existence of the UN itself.

Although it is natural to have a certain level of tension between the Administration and the Union, the current level of confrontation is unprecedented. This situation appears to mirror the political crises the Organization as a whole faces today. I believe concerted dialogue on the UN also has to be conscious of the importance of the International Civil Service as the backbone of the Organization as envisioned in the UN Charter.

Over the 60 years of the UN's history, the Administration implemented many restructuring and reform programmes in the Secretariat, while other much talked about reforms such as that of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, these have yet not taken place. It is, of course, easier to restructure the Secretariat as it falls directly under the Secretary-General. Although changes to the Secretariat ultimately require the approval of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has the ability to initiate and implement reforms. Another reason that reform within in the Secretariat is easier to affect, is that in general these changes have little impact on the national interests of Member States, other than maybe include the removal of certain high-level officials or the non-renewal of staff contracts of a particular country.

Nevertheless, it is important for the Secretariat to ensure a high level of efficiency and effectiveness, and so to implement appropriate reform. But reform should be aiming at strengthening the Organization, and not at undermining the UN.

Both the Administration and its staff (i.e., international civil servants) are required to act independently of any political pressure from the Member States. Article 100 of the UN Charter stipulates independence and neutrality as key obligations and responsibilities of the Member States, as well as of the Administration and the staff.

The Secretariat, which includes both the administration and the staff, functions simultaneously on two levels. First, the Secretariat performs a variety of actions at the level of management. This includes technical operations, planning, organization,

command, co-ordination and information. Day-to-day operations such as accounting, finance, staff management, supervision, administration of property, documentation, interpretation and translation are functions of internal management. Second, in parallel to these administrative actions of day-to-day operations, the Secretariat carries the responsibility of preserving the philosophy of the Organization as a whole.

It is no exaggeration to argue that the basic justification for the existence and activities of the UN is predicated upon the morality, loyalty, independence and neutrality of its International Civil Servants.

In a world of conflicts and in dire need for conciliation at all levels, an Organization that can exert trust and confidence in the minds of the people, particularly people affected by conflict, is imperative. The International Civil Service System was created to secure the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity and its existence must be reaffirmed and should be maintained free of political concerns.

* Former Executive Director, Asia Women's Fund; Chief Administrative Officer, UNU

Employment as a Global Issue

By Shinichi Hasegawa*

For sustainable peace and development, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) would like to stress the importance of commitment to secure employment for people.

The biggest failure of the current model of globalization is that, in too many places, it is not producing the level of work families need to achieve a decent quality of life in their communities.

In the past ten years, official unemployment has grown by more than 25 per cent. In the next years, we need to create about 40 million jobs annually simply to keep up with the growth of the global labour force. The task is particularly great for young people who represent almost half of the global unemployed.

Moving employment up the global priority list demands new public-private partnerships and much better policy coherence and coordination at every level: local, national, regional and internationally.

ILO is a tripartite International Organization where workers and employers play a very important role in decision-making. It is important to strengthen the cooperation and partnership among Global Civil Society and NPO's which represents the voice of residents and consumers on the one hand, and the constituents of the ILO, the Employers and Workers, who mainly represent the voice of producer of goods and services, on the other.

The question we therefore need to answer is how do we reach a productive relationship between Global Civil Society and employers and workers? What role should international organizations, including the ILO, play?

Partnership and cooperation with various organizations is essential for implementing ILO technical cooperation activities in developing countries. This can be seen in the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), and in efforts to prevent human trafficking. Often technical cooperation activities of the ILO are conducted with the participation of local NPOs. It would therefore be very useful if relevant NPOs are provided the opportunity to be better informed of the activities of UN agencies, so that they can actively engage in implementation activities in developing countries. Therefore, we need to critically examine what should the different stakeholders including UN agencies and NPOs do to achieve this goal? And, what in particular, can we do in Japan?

* Director, ILO Office, Tokyo; former ILO Representative for Asia and Pacific, Bangkok

UN Partnerships with Business and Civil Society – Opportunities and Challenges for the Global Compact

By Akio Nomura*

As a way to respond to the growing awareness of global interdependence and diversification of global actors, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan launched the Global Compact in July 2000. It was a unique initiative by the Secretary-General to engage business and civil society to advance universal social and environmental principles. He called on business leaders to join hands for fair globalization – in his words “globalization with a human face” – and encouraged them to engage in the promotion of good corporate citizenship.

The initial reaction in Japanese business circles was cautious and slow. Though the Global Compact is as a voluntary initiative, not a tool to rule or regulate corporate activities, for most Japanese companies the idea of entering into partnership with the UN was beyond their scope of thinking. For many the principles on human rights and labor appeared abstract. They found it difficult to design concrete measures around these principles to achieve tangible outcomes. Some executives also mentioned that they were concerned that in some far corner of their company’s global activity there might be cases that they are not aware of that are in breach of GC principles, would draw criticism from NGOs and the media, and thus spoil their company’s image.

Besides these obvious reasons, there is also a tendency in Japan and among corporate CEOs to wait and see how others react. Of course there are exceptions such as the CEOs of Kikkoman, Ricoh and Fuji Xerox Co. who signed letters of intent to the Secretary-General at an early stage. The powerful Japan Business Federation KEIDANREN, however, took a wait-and-see attitude. I must point out that it was not only business circles that were slow to respond to the Global Compact. Unlike some governments that quickly gave official endorsement to the Global Compact, the government of Japan initially showed little interest as well. It still remains that way.

Against this backdrop the UN Information Center (UNIC) in Tokyo started to act as a Global Compact focal point in Japan and launched local promotional activities in May 2002. Since then the UNIC has held learning forums for companies every couple of months to raise awareness and understanding of the Global Compact.

As the concept corporate social responsibility (CSR) gained prominence among business leaders in 2003 and 2004, the number of companies signing up to the Global Compact increased. The Secretary-General’s visit to Japan in February 2004 provided a major boost.

Leading member companies started to participate in Global Compact meetings and dialogues such as 2004 GC Leader’s Summit, 2005 Shanghai Summit and some of the network meetings. As of March 2006, 44 Japanese entities participate in the Global Compact – 43 companies and the city of Kawasaki.

However, as the number of the participating companies increased both locally and

globally, so did the challenges. As the report “Business Unusual”¹ pointed out, in many UN organizations partnership work remains at the institutional fringes and therefore disconnected from the main lines of work. Another problem is the lack of resources – both financial and human – to support the initiative. Changes in guiding policy at headquarters sometimes takes participating companies and local focal points by surprise. Also, from time to time the UNIC Tokyo and participating companies found it difficult to obtain adequate and timely response from headquarters.

Given that the Global Compact does not have strict measures to discipline members that breach principles, dealing with members accused of misconduct remains a significant problem. We have seen several companies cause social problems after they joined the Global Compact. A current and high-profile example is the fraudulent activity by “Livedoor”. How to screen the companies or NGOs that may cause problems or might try to “blue wash” their activities is a significant operational challenge.

In response to calls to decentralize the activities of the Global Compact, the Global Compact Japan Network was established in 2004. The purpose of this network is to enhance governance at the local level. In spring 2005 the network set up its steering committee.

I believe that Global Compact activities in Japan have contributed to narrow the distance between the UN and the private sector. However, it is still too early to say that local activity will produce tangible results in the larger context of UN objectives.

* ICU graduate; 1967~2002 Asahi Shimbun; 2003~2005 Director of the United Nations Information Center (Tokyo)

¹ The report was a collaborative effort of the UN Global Compact Office and the Global Public Policy Institute and published by the UN Global Compact Office in August 2005.

Observations on the Global Compact

By Susumu Nakamaru*

The Global Compact is an initiative requesting private companies to comply with human rights, labor and environment principles based on international treaties. Driving this initiative was growing concern about the negative impacts of globalization, especially multinational companies moving into countries or regions where legal regulations are comparatively loose. In need of foreign investment many such countries and regions have little choice but to accept that this foreign capital comes at the cost of comprising their countries' environment, labor, security and sanitation standards. As a result, many global companies damage the environment, violate human rights, and furthermore, exacerbate the gap between the rich and the poor. This state of affairs threatens not only the directly affected countries and regions, but also has implications for the sustainable development of the world as a whole. Currently, there is no central government to regulate the behavior of these companies under a unified authority. Instead, global companies need to become aware of their "social responsibility", and in this way work towards reducing the negative impacts of globalization.

The Global Compact, proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has increased its number of participants annually. However, it only requests a lax report, and includes no inspecting mechanism to monitor adherence to the principles. Therefore, the current system allows for companies to join the Global Compact, but in reality not do anything different. In short, it allows them to "free ride". Also, there is no mechanisms to reward participating companies that declare their serious intent to comply with the Global Compact's ten principles, and do indeed follow the principles. Some companies apply the Global Compact as a tool to improving their own social responsibility management system. Though their numbers are small, and though there is no mechanism to guarantee their reliability, these companies will make a considerable contribution to bringing about the realization of a sustainable society.

However, the majority of companies are not like them. It is therefore necessary to think multilaterally of a strategy to further spread and secure the reliability of the Global Compact. It is very rare for any system to be able to be everything to all its stakeholders. With this in mind I would like to propose some ideas to strengthen the Global Compact from two angles: Firstly, by combining the Global Compact with other measures, and secondly, by looking directly at the operations of the Global Compact.

Combining the Global Compact with other Measures

These include:

1. Linking implementation reports with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) – How to include small and medium-sized enterprises?
2. Linking the Global Compact with ISO guidance documents currently in discussion.
3. Creating a mechanism for stakeholder dialogue – Who will plan and execute the ideas? Global Compact secretariat of the UN, or each country's Global Compact network, or a NGO/NPO that takes this task upon itself? How will partnership

reliability be secured? How will it be financed?

4. Joining forces with the regulators of countries and local authorities to allocate credits to companies that adhere to Global Compact principles – Questions in this regard include how to handle items that are not ratified by international treaties, and how to determine the type and level of merits that can be made available for companies to earn?

5. Co-operating with NGOs and NPOs to promote implementation of Global Compact principles through dialogue, monitoring and capacity development – Questions that need to be considered include the social recognition and reliability of NPOs/NGOs.

6. Using mass media – Questions that need to be grappled with here include ensuring fair and consistent/continuous reporting.

Global Compact Operations: Re-examining Solutions and Re-organizing Tasks

These include:

1. Admission qualification standards (There are, for example, questions as to Louis Vuitton's eligibility.)
2. Language problems (Can the activities' reports be submitted in the language of each region?)
3. Relationship between the Global Compact UN Secretariat and the National Network
4. The state of administrative regulations of the National Network
5. Examining how the Japanese Government will be involved with the Global Compact.

* Founder, Sun Management Institute, former CSR Advisor of Ricoh Co. Ltd

Public-Private Partnerships to Fight Malaria

By Yasushi Katsuma*

Public-private partnerships have become prominent in global health, as issues related to infectious diseases are pushed onto the international policy agenda by multilateral organizations, bilateral development agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The international community is now firmly committed to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Health-related commitments include a two-thirds reduction in under-five child mortality, and a containment of the incidence of malaria, among others. However, when several public-private partnerships try to address one specific global health issue, the coordination among the relevant partnerships may become difficult in some cases. In this short paper, partnerships to fight malaria will be used as an example. As a framework of analysis, three levels of partnerships will be examined in this paper: a partnership for health policy coordination; a partnership for resource mobilization; and a country-level partnership for implementation.

Partnership for Anti-Malarial Policy Coordination

In 1998, the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) initiative was launched by the WHO, UNICEF, UNDP and the World Bank to build a partnership to reduce the incidence of malaria in the world, especially in Africa. The goal of the RBM partnership is to halve malaria by 2010, by forming an alliance of a wide range of partners, including malaria-endemic African countries, multilateral organizations, bilateral development agencies, NGOs, foundations and private businesses, organizations of affected communities, and research and academic institutions.

In 2000, African heads of state convened a RBM Summit in Abuja to express their personal commitment to fight malaria and to establish targets to implement the strategy to halving malaria by 2010. More recently, in January 2005, the United Nations Millennium Project released a report, prescribing a strategy to fight malaria. This includes the distribution of long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) that can cut child deaths by 20% when properly used.

The RBM partnership is translated into local action at the country-level, as part of the coordinated efforts by the United Nations Country Team, usually within the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) in each programme country. In the health sector, WHO usually acts as a lead agency in the United Nations Country Team, while UNICEF supports the coordination, in consultation with the host country, other multilateral organizations, bilateral development agencies, and NGOs.

A New Public-Private Partnership for Resource Mobilization

Achieving the MDGs and RBM targets requires massive increases in financial resources. However, each RBM partner has been mobilizing necessary resources to fight malaria in a decentralized manner. At the Kyushu–Okinawa G8 Summit in 2000, the leaders acknowledged the need to create a new mechanism. In Abuja, UN

Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the creation of a global fund to mobilize additional resources. In response, at the Genoa Summit held in July 2001, G8 leaders pledged their support to such a global fund. In this context, the “Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria” (The Global Fund) was established in January 2002.

The Global Fund is a foundation in Geneva, registered under Swiss law. Nevertheless it enjoys unique legal status and recognition in Switzerland, as a result of its public character and purpose. The Government of Switzerland recognizes that it has international legal personality, and grants it certain legal privileges and immunities similar to those granted to inter-governmental organizations.

The international Board of the Global Fund includes representatives of donor and recipient governments, NGOs, the private sector, and affected communities. United Nations agencies are not voting members of the Board, although the WHO, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the World Bank participate in the discussion.

The Global Fund’s Country Coordinating Mechanisms

To promote local ownership and participatory decision-making at the country level, the Global Fund encourages each programme country to establish its own Country Coordinating Mechanism. The country-level partnership established through the Country Coordinating Mechanism is expected to develop and submit grant proposals to the Global Fund, in accordance with the priority needs of the country.

The Country Coordinating Mechanisms include representatives from both the public and private sectors, including governments, NGOs, the private sector, and affected communities or people living with the diseases. Multilateral organizations, including United Nations agencies, also participate in the Country Coordinating Mechanisms although their headquarters are not part of the decision-making process of the Global Fund.

The “Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria” is a non-UN multilateral actor. Some may argue that it is a case of concrete action taken by “Global Civil Society.” However, in a sense, the Global Fund bypasses the United Nations system to some extent, while it maintains links with the Roll Back Malaria partnership. One question is whether the Global Fund erodes the leadership role of the United Nations system in the fight against malaria, both at the global and the country levels. Or if it is an innovative mechanism to create a new partnership of the United Nations system and “Global Civil Society,” allowing non-state actors and stakeholders to fully participate in the global governance of health?

* Programme Coordinator, UNICEF Tokyo. (From April 2006, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University). E-mail: ykatsuma@uwalumni.com

Non-State Actors' Participation in Multilateral Environmental Agreements

By Masanori Kobayashi*

Introduction

Multi-stakeholder participation is increasingly recognised as an important approach to promote sustainable development. The modalities of stakeholders' participation vary widely from the mere observation of meetings, to the management of funds and the implementation of projects. This comment note is intended to highlight some key aspects regarding the participation and involvement of so called "non-state actors" with particular emphasis on non-governmental organisations, civil society organisation and private companies in the process of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).

Bottom-up and Participatory Approach – The Case of the UNCCD

The 1992 Rio Summit brought two MEAs to the forefront of global endeavors to promote environmental protection and development in tandem. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) set a common platform for addressing climate change issues, while the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) provided an international action plan to conserve biological diversity and promote its sustainable and equitable use. Yet, either convention was as unequivocal on the role of NGOs and local communities in the implementation process as the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). The UNCCD was adopted two years after the Rio Summit (1994) and came into effect in 1996.

NGOs played a proactive role in the UNCCD implementation process in a number of ways:

- (a) Awareness raising – In the early phase of UNCCD, implementation countries affected by desertification organized national awareness seminars in which NGOs played a vital role to highlight the challenges posed by desertification. NGOs also helped forge partnerships for Convention implementation.
- (b) National action programme development – Countries also organized national workshops to develop national action programmes to combat desertification. NGOs here took the lead in developing components of community-based land management activities.
- (c) Pilot project development and implementation – NGOs are the major actors developing and promoting the implementation of pilot projects for rehabilitating degraded land and promoting sustainable land management such as agro-forestry, rangeland management and water management in dryland agriculture.

In the past five to ten years, developing countries have been involving NGOs to develop national biodiversity action plans under the CBD and national adaptation action

plans under the UNFCCC. It has become common practice to promote the participation and involvement of NGOs in the development and implementation of action plans and pilot project to support the achievement of Convention objectives.

Private Companies' Involvement in the Basel Convention

It has been the norm that private companies do not participate in the negotiations or consultative processes. Private companies are usually represented in such processes by business associations. However, there is growing recognition of the importance of the role of the private sector. Whether and how private companies can get directly involved in the MEA implementation process remains a contentious question.

The Basel Convention – which governs the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes – is one of the MEAs that has close links with private companies. Direct representation of private companies is not allowed, for instance, at the Conference of the Parties (COPs) to the Basel Convention. However, the Basel Convention has launched an e-waste initiative with cellular phone companies where the Convention Secretariat work closely with a number of cellular phone companies to promote the recycling of materials and the environmentally sound management of wastes in the global cellular phone industry.

The term “corporate social responsibility” (CSRs) is widely used these days, attesting to the growing role that private companies going to be playing in the global endeavors to promote sustainable development. It may become an issue soon whether and how the direct involvement of private companies can be promoted in other MEA implementation processes.

Sacrosanct Domain – International Decision- Making

Despite the widening avenues for the NGOs and private companies to play proactive roles in MEA implementation processes, they are not given any right to participate in decision-making at the international level. Unlike societal actors in the ILO, non-state actors in the environmental domain are not given any right to participate in decision- making on an equal footing with the state actors. Even in human right arenas, individuals and non-state actors are guaranteed a procedure to contest the decisions and practices of the state-actors. No such avenues exist in environmental governance.

*Senior Researcher, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES)

GPPAC – Civil Society Seeks a New Multilateralism for Peace

By Akira Kawasaki, Peace Boat

Recognizing the increasing power of civil society and public opinion, the Cardoso Report on UN-civil society relations stated in June 2004 that “multilateralism no longer concerns Governments alone but is now multifaceted.”¹ The World Summit in September 2005 stimulated the UN reform debate internationally and focused, in particular, on the issues of armed conflict and violence worldwide. Through the debate, the global call for a broader and deeper partnership between the UN and civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding has been strengthened.

GPPAC

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), a worldwide civil society network that was launched in 2002 in response to the UN Secretary-General’s call, took the lead in promoting the roles of civil society organizations (CSOs) in conflict prevention and peace building.² The GPPAC process is divided into fifteen regional processes. “Regional Action Agendas” (RAAs) on conflict prevention were developed by regional networks between 2004 and 2005.

Based on recommendations in the RAAs, the international process of GPPAC developed a “Global Action Agenda” (GAA) in June 2005 entitled *People Building Peace: A Global Action Agenda for the Prevention of Violent Conflict*. This document was endorsed by over 500 CSOs worldwide, before being submitted to the UN Secretary-General. In July 2005, a GPPAC Global Conference was held at the UN Headquarters in New York with nearly 1000 NGO representatives, diplomats and UN officials participating. The GAA promoted the concept of human security and called for a fundamental shift “from reaction to prevention” in dealing with conflicts. The GPPAC process also generated interactions between the Security Council and civil society on the issue.³

Northeast Asian Regional Mechanism for Peace

Peace Boat took up the initiating role within the GPPAC Northeast Asia regional process. In February 2005, the GPPAC Northeast Asia Regional Conference was held at the United Nations University (UNU), Tokyo, and delegates adopted a 30-page RAA.⁴ More than 50 NGO activists and scholars gathered from Seoul, Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taipei, Vladivostok, Ulaanbaatar, and all over Japan. It was the first time in Northeast Asia that NGOs from the whole region (except Pyongyang⁵) came together and to try to reach a common understanding on conflict prevention objectives.

The RAA entitled *Tokyo Agenda – Towards Creation of a Regional Mechanism for Peace* recognized in its Preamble that “Northeast Asia is the only region in the world with Cold War remaining among states” as represented in tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. It noted that the region “has a comparatively heavy concentration of armaments and military forces. The danger being that there is an extremely high risk of the outbreak of armed conflict and yet very little in the way of

preventive mechanisms within the region.”

In terminating the Cold War structure, the *Tokyo Agenda* stated that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution – the provision which renounces war and the maintenance of forces – “should be recognized as having universal value and therefore utilized as a foundation for peace in Northeast Asia.” It advocated a comprehensive and integrated approach with a wide range of non-military civilian actions for a regional peace mechanism. The following are key tasks highlighted in the *Tokyo Agenda*.

- 1 **Peaceful Coexistence:** Disarmament and Demilitarization
 - Resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula peacefully, support the Six-Party Talks process, and establish a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ).
 - Reduce tension and build confidence on the Taiwan Straits issue.
 - Stop the construction of new US bases and encourage US forces to gradually withdraw from current stations.
 - Define all disputed territories in Northeast Asia as Demilitarized Zones.
 - Japan should abide by and preserve Article 9 of its Constitution.
- 2 **Peaceful Engagement:** Humanitarian and Development Assistance
 - Japan and South Korea should stop participation in the occupation of Iraq.
 - Create a Northeast Asia Disaster Prevention and Relief Corps.
- 3 **Culture of Peace:** Justice, Human Rights and Diversity
 - Pass down the memories of war, atomic bombings and colonization.
 - Cooperate to achieve a common recognition of history education in Northeast Asia.
 - Develop networks of peace educators through seminars and online databases.
- 4 **Economy for Peace :** Sustainable Economy and Economic Justice
 - Work to redress national and regional disparity with a view to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
 - Institutionalize Cooperate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices region-wide.

With regard to the implementation of the *Tokyo Agenda*, members of GPPAC Northeast Asia network convened from March 1 – 6, 2006 at Mt. Kumgang in North Korea⁶, and in Seoul, South Korea. They agreed to a five-year action plan that includes the following priorities:

- Carrying out regional and global coordinated actions on **September 21 as part of the international Peace One Day movement** to promote public awareness about the 1981 declared International Day of Peace.
- Promoting the Global Article 9 Campaign, including holding an **Article 9 Global Conference in 2008** in Japan.
- Holding informal **confidence-building forums** among students, municipal officials, young diplomats and members of the business community to discuss contentious issues such as historical recognition and territorial disputes.

- Establishing a multi-lingual website named the *Northeast Asia Online Peace Forum*, where information regarding the implementation of GPPAC regional and global agendas can be shared and disseminated systematically.

NGO – Governmental Dialogue in Japan

The GPPAC process also provided Japanese NGOs with an opportunity to engage in policy consultations with the government, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and with UN agencies based in Tokyo, including the UNU and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Prior to the World Summit a Public Forum on UN Reform co-sponsored by MOFA and NGOs was held in Tokyo. It was the first time in Japan that NGOs and MOFA formally held a UN policy consultation, and they agreed to continue, with a view to institutionalizing this consultation mechanism.²

Conclusion

In Northeast Asia, where regional common security arrangements do not exist at a governmental level, GPPAC is providing civil society with a framework within which to work hand-in-hand. It has thereby taken initiative ahead of governments. As can be seen with regard to the European Union and African Union, the roles of regional organizations are becoming increasingly important in promoting peace. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN is pursuing an ASEAN Charter in the context of creating an East Asia Community. New momentum is being generated in Northeast Asia for more inclusive multilateralism which engages the UN, governments and civil society. Such developments have great significance and potential for creating an era of peace in the region to overcome divisions and distrust.

* Akira Kawasaki is a member of Executive Committee of Peace Boat and Program Coordinator for its Global University, a peace educational program onboard the Global Voyage. He is former Secretary General of the Yokohama-based NGO Peace Depot. He has written several books and numerous articles on nuclear disarmament, the war in Iraq and security issues in Northeast Asia, including 'Nuclear Proliferation' (2003 Iwanami Shoten).
<http://www.peaceboat.org>

¹ <http://www.un.org/reform/panel.htm>

² <http://www.gppac.net> GPPAC was launched in response to Kofi Annan's recommendation in his report *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, June 7, 2001 (A/55/985-S/2001/574)

³ Security Council held a session on "the role of civil society in conflict prevention and the pacific settlement of disputes," September 20, 2005, and invited GPPAC and other civil society representatives to the session. S/PV.5264

⁴ http://www.peaceboat.org/english/nwps/cn/arc/050204/naraan_gppac.pdf

⁵ Non-governmental organizations in Pyongyang were consulted by organizers of GPPAC Northeast Asia. They showed interest, but have not participated so far.

⁶ Mt. Kumgang has been developed as a sightseeing spot for South Koreans since 1998 by South Korean Hyundai. It provides a unique venue for interactions between North-South citizens.

⁷ Through a joint initiative of Peace Boat, Japan International Volunteer Center and Shimin Gaiko Centre, the Public Forum on UN Reform in co-sponsorship of Japanese NGOs and MOFA was launched and has had two sessions to date (August 2005 and February 2006).
<http://www.peaceboat.org/english/nwps/sm/arc/050830/index.html>

Some Reflections on NGOs' Participation in the Decision-Making Process at the UN

By Mikiko Otani*

Since the extension of the qualification of NGOs for the consultative status with ECOSOC to the domestic NGOs under the ECOSOC resolution 1996/31, many domestic NGOs whose membership and activities are limited at the national level applied for the status and the number of the NGOs accredited to that status has greatly increased reaching close to 3,000 by now. The NGOs in Japan are not exception for this trend. Currently roughly 30 NGOs in Japan are registered as those in consultative relations with ECOSOC and most of them were accredited to that status after 1996 under this new system.

I have attended several UN meetings and conferences in the area of human rights as the delegate of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, one of such domestic NGOs in Japan accredited to the consultative status with ECOSOC under the new system. In addition, I was delegated to the Third Committee of the 60th UN General Assembly last year as the alternate representative of the Japanese Government in my NGO capacity of the vice president of the Japan Women's Bar Association. In this paper, I would like to share some reflections based on my observations through those experience on how to bring the voice of NGOs and civil society to the UN in more effective and meaningful ways.

Three levels of NGOs' participation

One of the ways for NGOs to participate in the decision making process at the United Nations is through the formal relationship of the consultative status with ECOSOC. With this status, NGOs have privileges of attending the meetings of ECOSOC and its subsidiary organs as observers, making written or oral statements, and even proposing an agenda depending on the category. NGOs have played important roles and made significant contributions to the work of the UN in the field of human rights particularly in standard setting and their implementation. This formal relationship between the UN and NGOs is unique considering the intergovernmental nature of the UN, and it has greatly helped NGOs to have access to the UN meetings and very often to the UN World Conferences on various issues such as women, environment, population, social development, human rights, racial discrimination and so forth. NGOs have made full use of this privilege to influence the decision-making at the UN not only through the ways they are formally permitted to intervene as described above but also through more informal but practical techniques including active lobbying to the government delegates in the corridors.

Recognizing the benefits of this formal participation in the UN meetings, even though only as observers, NGOs have called for the expansion of their access to all the organs of the UN such as the General Assembly and the Security Council. Although I am inclined to support this call from NGOs, I would like to point out that the consultative status is only one of the three possible ways that may allow civil society to bring its voice into the decision-making process at the UN. The other two are dialogue

with the governments at the national level, and participation in the government delegation to the UN meetings. I would like to stress the importance of the former in particular in the context of the Japanese situation where only fewer than 30 NGOs are accredited to the consultative status and most of them are based in Japan. Without the permanent representatives based in New York, Geneva or Vienna, it is practically impossible for the domestic NGOs in Japan to effectively intervene in the decision-making process at the UN and I believe that this may be the case for many other similar NGOs in other countries especially in the South. Japanese NGOs have already approached the government seeking for the dialogue but not in a fully organized or strategic way so far.

Our experience makes us feel that the government has just “listened to” us, while the meetings are not confrontational. There is still need for us NGOs to make greater efforts to have real influence on the policy making of our own governments at the national level on the issues discussed in the UN meetings. The other way for civil society to participate in the decision-making process at the UN is to be included in the government delegation as I myself experienced. Many NGO activists are skeptical and careful about such arrangement with the fear of losing independence from the government. It is beneficial, however, for NGOs to observe more closely the mechanism, process, complexity and political or financial consideration of the decision-making of the government, without which we would continue to fail to have our voice reflected in the government policy. Inclusion into the government delegation also has a particular advantage when the doors of the UN meetings are closed to NGOs. For the closed meetings, NGO representatives in the government delegation can play a role as focal points in their delegation teams to connect civil society to the intergovernmental deliberation. The practice to include NGO representatives in the government delegation has been seen in some states and is now considered as a critical scheme to bring the expertise, knowledge and experience of the parties concerned in the on-going negotiation to draft a new UN treaty on the rights of the disabled persons. While each of three levels of NGOs participation in the decision making process at the UN as described here has its own value, it is important to combine to make each of them effective.

Need of Creating Space for Women and Youth

It is impressive that the Japanese government has continued to give women NGOs one seat in the delegation to the UN General Assembly Third Committee since its first attendance at the UN General Assembly as a Member State. Women and youths as the representative of civil society need special space for participation in the decision-making process at the UN, since they are often marginalized in the society in spite of an increasingly wider recognition of their critical roles. To make sure to have their voice heard at the UN, some institutional arrangement for their participation should be devised.

Special Roles of Parliamentarians

Parliamentarians are another group of individuals who have special roles. The Indian government delegation in the UN General Assembly third committee has a unique practice in this regard, as it brings many parliamentarians to the UN. While the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) has been actively involved in the UN work at the

international level, more could be done to encourage the parliamentarians to be included in the government delegations or to be more active to reflect the voice of civil society in their government policy on the agenda of the UN meetings at the national level, which I believe would help the UN become more democratic and accountable for, and representative of, the whole civil society.

* Attorney at law, Vice President of the Japan Women's Bar Association; Member of the delegation to the Third Committee, General Assembly 60th Session.

The Public Forum in Japan for Accountable UN Reform – NGOs' Input

By Kiyotaka Takahashi*

Public Forum on UN Reform

2005 marked the 60th anniversary of the end of WWII and of the creation of the UN. In addition various political events, including the G8 Summit in Scotland in July, and the UN World Summit in September, took place. 2005 also saw strong calls from a global people's movement for policy reform on debt, aid and trade, for poverty reduction and for the achievement of the MDGs.

The Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC) was committed to be involved in policy advocacy along with the Japanese national campaign for poverty reduction, namely the "White-Band" or "Make Poverty History" campaign ("Don't let it be – World poverty" is the direct translation of the Japanese campaign name). While being actively involved in various policy-related activities in the development sector, we also recognized that global issues such as poverty reduction must be addressed in a comprehensive manner in order to tackle other global issues such as the environment and conflict at the same time. This is because we recognize that the three key sectors of security, development and human rights are interlinked. With this recognition, three NGOs representing the three key sectors respectively (Peaceboat for security, Shimin Gaikou Centre for human rights, and JVC for development) agreed to release a joint statement on UN reform based on NGO experiences.

This statement was followed up with an open public forum on 30th August, where NGOs and civil society working in the three sectors discussed important issues regarding UN reform with the Japanese government especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was a unique initiative because the forum was the first opportunity for civil society to discuss different issues about UN policies from interdisciplinary perspectives focusing on human security and peacebuilding. The forum succeeded in increased public awareness and brought together about 150 individuals, including NGOs and academics, to discuss a range of UN-related global issues. This was at a time when no media coverage touched upon any details of UN reform apart from the basic issue of reforming the Security Council – which is the primary concern of the Japanese government. There was a good response from the participants, both from the members of public and from the government.

Last month we were able to organize a second forum to consolidate the foundation for developing further dialogue on related diplomatic policies of the UN on peace, development and human rights. We hope that these joint civil society-government forums will continue and contribute to more transparent and accountable diplomacy in Japan, and ultimately towards better global governance of the international community.

Joint NGO Statement on UN Reform¹

The statement includes many appeal points to make the UN more credible. It is based on the following (Please refer to the original text for your reference):

- 1) restoring credibility,
- 2) the importance of universality,
- 3) the importance of a rights-based approach,
- 4) remedies for vulnerable or marginalized groups,
- 5) strengthening the financial basis to enhance credibility, and
- 6) staff training.

* Research and Policy Manager, Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC). Currently working on ODA reform, civil-military relationship, and global governance including innovative sources for financing development. Also teaching development and peace studies at Keisen University. kiyo@ngo-jvc.net

¹ Full text is available at JVC website:
http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/projects/advocacy/pdf/advocacy_un_reform.pdf

Bottom-up Perspective in Achieving Sustainable Development – Local Agenda 21 Process in Sweden

By Midori Okabe*

Sustainable Development in UN Framework

The first multinational conference on environmental issues, the UN Conference on Human Environment was held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972. This conference placed environmental issues high on the international political agenda and increased awareness of environmental protection among UN members. This paved the way to the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 where Agenda 21 was adapted as an action plan to achieve sustainable development along with the conventions on climate change and biodiversity. Agenda 21 covers all the aspects of environmental issues and calls for local engagement in the process.

With strong commitment to UN agreements on environmental issues since 1972, Sweden took serious endeavors to put the idea of sustainable development onto practice. Agenda 21 had a great impact at all levels: national, regional, and local level. Today, Sweden is considered as one of most sustainable nations around the world. According to the barometer of sustainability by the World Conservation Union, Sweden is ranked the highest among 180 countries¹. The Environmental Sustainable Index by Yale University and Columbia University placed Sweden as forth among 146 countries². The questions of interest in this regard are: How does Sweden go about implementing sustainable development policies? And, what are the lessons to be learned from the Swedish experience?

Bottom-up Process of Local Agenda 21 in Sweden

Sweden's national strategy to implement Agenda 21 takes a bottom-up approach. The Central Government considers local authorities, business sector, and civil society as key actors to bring about sustainable development. The Government started a campaign including mass advertisement through websites and printed materials. In 1998, the Government launched the Local Investment Program to provide grants to encourage local sustainable development projects. The grant funds 1,700 projects and amounted to a total of SEK 6.2billion (674m Euro) during 1998-2003, creating about 20,000 new full time jobs³. This financial contribution empowered local actors and especially municipalities. In Sweden, all 289 municipalities adapted their operations to Local Agenda 21. This local involvement was one of the highest among European counties. Municipalities' role is critical in implementing Agenda 21, since they provide daily services to citizens. Municipalities also involved local actors such as NGOs and private sectors in their Agenda 21 process.

Local Stakeholder Involvement in Kalmar

While all municipalities utilised local multi-stakeholder processes, a particularly good example is the Kalmar Municipality which has 60,000 citizens and is located in southern Sweden. Kalmar City initiated Local Agenda 21 in cooperation with various

local stakeholders including universities, the business sector and citizens. To facilitate liaison among stakeholders, Kalmar City set up monthly “environmental coffee breaks” – that is informal meetings to discuss the environment. As a result, numerous projects were implemented, including ecological refurbishment of apartments, wetland water treatment facilities, and biomass district heating plants.

Moreover, the business community, local authorities in the region and Kalmar University established a company called “Sustainable Sweden South East AB” to export environmental technology to other regions. Kalmar City has also become engaged in international cooperation to transfer know-how concerning Local Agenda 21. One such example is a capacity building project for Local Agenda 21 implementation in Viet Nam⁴.

Learning from Swedish Experience

What accounts for the successful implementation of Agenda 21 in Sweden? *The first factor is strong political will of the Central Government.* In 1996, the Government declared its vision for a “Green Welfare State.” Three years later, the Government set 15 environmental objectives to be achieved by 2020, and accelerated national efforts towards sustainable development. In 2005, the Ministry of Sustainable Development was established to coordinate works on sustainable development at a national level as well as to promote cooperation at the global level. The strong leadership of the Government and the nationwide campaign including economic incentives such as a green tax and the Local Investment Program were the driving force in the Agenda 21 activities at all levels.

The second factor was the strong capacity of local authorities to carry out the Local Agenda 21 implementation. In Sweden, local government is in a strong position. This is based on the Swedish tradition of decentralized governance. Local government, for example, has the right to set local taxes and charges for certain services. The local government is responsible for a wide range of services including housing, roads, environment, education, elderly care, and energy supply. This autonomy enables municipalities to integrate Agenda 21 activities into their local plan, reflecting local conditions and the citizens’ needs, based on their own prioritizations. For instance, municipalities can draft their own energy policy. This contributed to the drastic shift from fossil fuel to renewable energy sources (e.g., 75% of Kalmar’s district heating system which covers most houses in the city comes from biomass energy today).

The third factor is the active participation of civil society. Numerous NGOs were involved in Agenda 21 activities. For example, a Swedish environmental organization, the Natural Step founded in 1989, assisted municipalities and private companies to draw up environmental action plans by providing a guideline and framework⁵. Another NGO, Friluftets Framjandet, provided environmental education for two million children by 2000 and promoted general public awareness of Agenda 21.

Strong national leadership combined with capable bottom-up activities which included local actors was the key for success in Sweden. It can be argued that environmental agreements in the UN framework will not be successfully implemented without democratic process involving non-state local actors including municipality, business and NGOs. A major challenge will be how states can find ways to take

effective leadership, decentralize the governing systems and empower local actors politically and financially. As the Kalmar case shows, local municipality with successful Local Agenda 21 experiences are now exporting their know-how to local communities in developing countries. Also, Natural Step now has local offices in eleven countries. In short, local players are playing an increasingly important role in efforts to bring about sustainable development, not only in the national context, but also in the global context.

* Project Manager, Natural Step International

¹ Countries Ranked by Wellbeing Index, the World Conservation Union

² 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index, Yale University and Columbia University

³ From Vision to Action-Swedish National Report to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002. Swedish National Committee on Agenda 21 and Habitat.

⁴ Lecture by Kalmar LA21 Coordinator, Bo Lindholm at Environmental Municipality Symposium on 31 March 2003 at Hosei University in Tokyo, held by Scandinavian Tourist Board.

⁵ Natural Challenge, Karl-Henrik Robert, 1998, Shinhyoron.

The Significance of US-Canada-Japan Trilateral Research on UN Reform

By Kunio Katakura*

To promote “public engagement of non-state actors and social campaigns of people in the reform process of the United Nations”, it is fitting to choose representatives from the USA, Canada and Japan. These three countries share values such as freedom, democracy and commitment to public welfare. These countries have also accumulated substantial experience to find solutions to international disputes, have participated in peace-keeping operations, and have provided humanitarian assistance (refugee and natural disasters, for example) and environmental issues.

A third reason to support a trilateral project is that the participants may differ in their approaches to the research questions. In the past, heated debates regarding peace or war issues such as Viet Nam and Iraq, or the environment (Kyoto Protocol) have taken place among US and Canadian participants, even though they are direct neighbors.

Japan, although a close ally of the USA in the Pacific region and a member of the G8, is essentially an Asian state sharing an Asian identity, traditions and cultural values with other Asian neighbors. Japan has also recently been more self-assertive to press for UN Charter revisions, for instance, by deleting the “former enemy clause” and by calling for expanding Security Council membership, including additional permanent seats for Japan and a few other countries.

In recent years, Japanese non-state actors and institutions have begun to play a more active role in Japan-initiated and UN-blessed international engagements such as Afghan and Iraqi rehabilitation and development conferences, as well as TICADs (Tokyo International Conferences on African Development). However, it seems to me that compared to US and Canadian non-state actors, Japanese counterparts are still a little behind in their over-all commitment to active partnership with the work of UN system and their public engagement in the UN reform process.

This type of international project is useful to stimulate and encourage Japanese non-state actors and institutions to widen their scope of public engagement, so that they may play a more dynamic role in working together with US and Canadian counterparts to influence the UN’s reform process.

I fully endorse this trilateral venture and would hereby like to urge well-placed funding organizations such as the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership to support this endeavour from the earliest stages of project development, through to research undertaking and follow-up steps such dissemination of insights gained.

* Chief Representative, Islamic Studies Society 21, and former Ambassador to Egypt and Iraq.

Japan's Interest in UN Reform for Human Welfare

By Yoshio Takano*

The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP) was established in 1991 to:

- ⌘ promote collaboration between Japan and the United States with the goal of fulfilling shared global responsibilities and contributing to improvements in the world's welfare, and
- ⌘ to enhance dialogue and interchange among Japanese and US citizens on a wide range of issues, thereby improving bilateral relations.

To accomplish these objectives the CGP plans and implements various activities through its Intellectual Exchange and Grassroots Exchange Programs. In the fields of intellectual exchange CGP organizes and supports policy-relevant collaborative research and dialogue among scholars and practitioners to encourage global partnership between Japan, the United States, and other nations of the world. And, with regard to grassroots exchange, the CGP provides support for exchange projects that involve issue-oriented cooperation and learning among youth, non-profit organizations, and members of the general public in both Japan and the United States. CGP also provides support for educational outreach activities to foster mutual understanding and awareness between Japan and the United States.

The United Nations (UN) is the largest international organization and endeavors to solve global issues such as international peace and security, human rights, economics, sustainable development, natural disasters, HIV/AIDS, and coexistence of people with diverse cultural backgrounds. These issues are overlapping with the main interest areas of the CGP. In fact, since its inception the CGP has been giving grants to many intellectual research and dialogue projects that focus on the role of UN.

Contributing to world welfare through the UN has been one of the basic policies of Japanese diplomacy since Japan was reborn as a democratic nation and advocate of universal peace after World War II. Japan was accepted as an official member of UN in 1956. Currently the UN is in a process of drastic organizational reform to adjust itself to the post-Cold War context. Japan has great interest in this process and is making substantial commitments to it. Not only politicians and government officials but also the general public in Japan is interested in UN reform. But most of the discussions in Japan are focused on how to restructure the Security Council. To illustrate, the website of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has a section dedicated to UN Reform; however, it is dominated by information on the reform of the Security Council.

International security remains the primary purpose of the UN. Yet, the traditional framework pertaining to international security has changed significantly after the end of Cold War. The UN's role and functions should therefore be discussed in relation to traditional as well as non-traditional aspects of security. Now that the chances for major wars on a global scale are diminishing and rather civil strife, local disputes, and terrorist

attacks come to be our main security concerns we need to focus on peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts, and other types of MOOTW (military operation other than war) including disaster relief by military personnel. As can be seen in efforts towards the promotion of the concept 'human security' our understanding of security has changed. What constitutes security has come to include many elements that were not traditionally regarded as relevant. These new recognitions include the important role non-governmental organizations and civil society need to play in international security. This new understanding is reflected in the CGP receiving grant proposals for research on the effective cooperation between the military and civil sectors in such fields as disaster relief and state reconstruction after warfare.

UN reform is not only about reform of the Security Council – even if the latter is an essential dimension of the former. To enable quick and productive implementation of policies the UN should be reformed to take into account the opinions and contributions of non-state actors. Hopefully the efforts of the ICU/COE-ICRA Joint Research project will contribute to strengthen networking among scholars and specialists concerned with UN reform, to join forces and so provide constructive input into the formation of a new re-vitalised system for the UN.

* Director, Intellectual Exchange Division, The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP)

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

Recommendations Made by Keynote Speakers

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Reflections by Takeo Uchida

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Research Direction: Towards a Trilateral Collaborative
Research Project

Recommendations Made by Keynote Speakers for the Trilateral Research Project

Usui We would like to invite our four keynote speakers to make brief concluding comments and recommendations for our research project. Let us start with Dr. Ritchie.

Ritchie I would suggest that we focus on best practices: What really works, and what would help us in overcoming obstacles and circumventing problems. As a civil society booster, I would like to understand how to circumvent problems in the mechanisms of UN-civil society partnerships. Research should perhaps focus on networks. Not necessarily only big powerful networks but all kinds of networks. It would not be too difficult to identify some key networks and expand on this idea in this tripartite collaboration among the US, Canadian and Japanese researchers. I personally wish to see the project take off on a bit more enlarged basis by bringing Norwegians and Swedes in, as well as some other key people from relevant international organizations. The Inter-Parliamentary Union would be a useful partner too. And also one or two persons in the top ranks of the UN System, - either from the UNDP or, still better, some key persons connected with the UN Secretary General Office. Inclusion of such key people would make a difference.

There are a few key issues that seem worth pursuing. Firstly, the concept of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). The concept has promise to break through some of the problems the UN currently grapples with. Efforts to promote acceptance of the idea that leaders are responsible for the protection of the weak and vulnerable is a very worthwhile research and advocacy concern indeed.

A second key issue is the Peacebuilding Commission. This body holds great promise too, but it already faced significant constraints, principally the absence of sufficient funding. Is that accidental? Let us throw the question to the ministers and ambassadors who approved the idea. They are not following up with funds. It is certainly worthwhile going deeper into this question. The lack of funding is a major impediment to effective UN reform. In fact, the lack of funding as a major dimension to the overall reform process is in disparate need to further analysis.

Still another interesting issue that could be pursued may be along the lines of what Mr. David Drake described as a Canadian practice in engaging civil society actors in the UN processes. More civil society people can be included in the governmental delegations to important intergovernmental conferences and commissions.

Usui Thank you very much. Next we move to Ms. Dillon-Ridgley.

Dillon-Ridgley In reply to David Drake I would like to comment shortly on the practice of including civil society actors in US delegations. I joined twelve US delegations – the last being the 2002 Earth Summit in Johannesburg. The reason that I have not joined any since is probably due to my political stance vis-à-vis the current US administration. The US has a similar approach to Canada. While I had an appointment from then-President Bill Clinton, I was always asked to be on the delegation in my capacity as a private sector advisor, usually specializing in gender issues. I was to make

sure that no one would miss my NGO role on the delegation. The US Government does not finance such NGO roles. There are two or three rare exceptions but on the whole, if you are on the US delegation as private sector advisor, you finance yourself. I wonder if there could be some sort of template for encouraging and structuring civil society participation in governmental delegations. I know some governments blatantly refuse to have any non-civil servant entity on their delegations. I think in many instances broader representation on governmental delegations might actually help change the outcomes of UN affairs.

Secondly, I would like to share an example from Egypt where the American Embassy was asked for assistance in terms of civil society expertise. This can be related to the point that Charles Aanenson made, and your intervention which actually reinforced his point in the context of the role of Japan. In this example I was on loan for three months to the Egyptian government to work with civil society actors in the country. The task was to build a foundation for the Islamic world and the Egyptian government to collaborate to help strengthen and support civil society. This took place ahead of the International Conference of Population and Development (ICPD). I worked with the NGO steering committee in Egypt leading up to that Conference. One of the most striking things then was that my intervention in the committee involved the exact same messages as many Egyptian and American government officials were trying to convey. But because I was sitting there as a member of civil society, local NGO people accepted and embraced even the kind of words and thoughts which they would never have accepted if given directly by governments. So, we should think of how we could encourage creative ways of being able to move and support civil society community internally.

Lastly, a comment on researching institutional impediments. While I was on Bill Clinton's Council of Sustainable Development, for example, the antitrust laws were looked upon as a critical impediment to getting rid of cadmium batteries. The problem with these batteries is that they were leaching into water tables after disposal. A very healthy move was made by the private sector. There were only five manufacturers of cadmium batteries in the world. They came together and worked out a scheme to recycle these materials by placing boxes at hardware stores and places where they were sold, so that they wouldn't be thrown into the trash, but instead would be collected. Unfortunately, the US Justice Department said, "No, no, no, you cannot do that because you are flying in the face of antitrust laws". They said so even though the proposed recycling scheme had nothing to do with oligopolistic collusion. They said, "Okay, we won't do it in the United States. We will do it somewhere else." And they also said, "If you do it, we will come and get you, and bring charges against you no matter where you are on the planet." The issue was eventually resolved but it took about 18 months. My point is simply that our institutions and structures, and more importantly our needs and capacity, have changed so much that some of the basic fundamental legal structures are now becoming substantial barriers and impediments to our capability of moving forward. I hope that our research would begin to look at some of those institutional impediments. We have to find ways of rectifying our ships in order to move ahead to facilitate the entire process.

Usui Thank you, Ms Dillon-Ridgley. Now we give the floor to Dr. Popovski.

Popovski It is difficult not to repeat what some others have already mentioned. But I

will try very briefly to outline what I think is important for our future research project. Alistair Edgar mentioned an important point in his keynote speech this afternoon: We still have limited knowledge about the leaders and players in “civil society”, and how they go about their work. One important task would be to document success stories that reveal best practices, not only in terms of international peace making, but also in terms of advocacy and in terms of research that supports it. Who are the players in civil society and how do they do their work? What are the positive examples of work of non-state international organisations? I think there is still much to be done to fill knowledge gaps in this domain. The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) played a significant role in shaping the global *opinion juris* regarding international crimes and accountability for them. It also strongly lobbied with states to sign and ratify the Rome Statue. Similar roles are played by thousands of non-state environmental organisations around the world. Many are currently concentrating on urging countries to curb emissions and comply with the Kyoto Protocol.

Second, some colleagues already mentioned the need to identify specific issue areas where civil society engagement might produce tangible results. For that matter, peace-building happens to be a major future research project in my institution, the United Nations University (UNU). We are looking at peace-building, thematically and also institutionally with reference to the new structures created in the UN (the Peacebuilding Commission and the the Peace Support Office in New York). We are committed to look at this problem area from both a state and a non-state perspective.

Thirdly, the benefits of multi-stakeholder approaches needs to be clarified. What I find particularly important is to classify relevant organizations. There are different players for different purposes. There are substantial differences between advocacy NGOs, and research and university NGOs. This is a complex picture. I do not like the term global civil society because it is too abstract. We need to deconstruct it, to examine it and to know what is within it. Who are the human rights activists and environmental activists? Which types of NGOs will be the best to engage for which purpose? Certainly it would be valuable to classify NGOs in terms of different layers, tasks, purposes and actors. Also, in the context of a research programme, it become important at some point to see how the research may affect our policy advocacy objectives and strategies.

To summarize, a future research project might have three main tasks:

1. To document and look at the best practices from the past as a source of inspiration and lessons for the future. One can look at the CICC, NGOs supporting the Kyoto Protocol and others.
2. Based on the first, to identify areas where the engagement of civil society actors is feasible, desirable and effective. Peacebuilding is certainly an area to consider.
3. To establish a methodology to classify civil society organisations into groups by their orientation, purpose, size, capacities. Such a data base requires constant updating, but would be invaluable to engage the most appropriate actors for specific purposes.

Usui Thank you very much. Now lastly, Dr. Edgar has the floor.

Edgar During my undergraduate days I was under a good professor, who always emphasized the importance of defining the terms I used. So this is why in my paper I tried hard at least to ask what we meant by “new”. What do we mean by partnership, an

equal relationship or an unequal one? What do we mean by the UN system, the system as a whole or a particular constituent part? What do you mean by “global” civil society? Who are involved in it? How do we measure and evaluate their performances? Are we talking about new institutions, new structures or new processes emerging in partnership-building? Are these really new partnerships between states or between institutions? Or are they merely part of an ongoing process where partnerships have been sufficiently flexible and fluid to respond to the best new ideas that become available? I do not think that I saw, or want to see, any particular singular model to recommend, but I would rather search for a variety of different models. This point seems to have been mentioned several times by different participants in this room.

Here is what I scribbled down, “Should we work towards creating a best practice handbook for coordination between civil society organizations, private sector organizations, governments, and the UN system?” Some ideas have been floating around. A handbook on success stories should be able to reveal factors accounting for successes as well as failures, pointing to desirable support mechanisms as well as critical impediments. This seems to me something that would be useful to take a look at. I am not sure if the Canadian model of government-NGO partnering is really a good one. It may be just a good one, not the good one.

The ACUNS, for which I work as Executive Director, is an NGO accredited to ECOSOC and UN Department of Public Information. We are funded by a university and educational institution and a Canadian billionaire. So, we are funded by a thoughtful individual philanthropist and the government of Canada. We also closely collaborate with the UNU. Our partnerships include both private and public sector members, institutional as well as individual. Most of our events are dependent on the good offices of governments: for 2006, the Brazilian and the Swiss governments; hopefully for 2007 the American government, for 2009 the German government, etc. We’re thus an example of an organization that cuts across multiple countries and uses all possible dimensions of intellectual partnerships. I have to say that I feel already very much embedded in, and supported but not co-opted by, many different member organizations. And yet, I am sure that acquainting ourselves with many more best practices, as well as worst practices, would be something that will be very usefully add to this collaboration program of ours.

Concluding Reflections

Takeo Uchida

I won't attempt to summarize all the points addressed today, but I'll add some personal reflections on the issues raised this morning and this afternoon. It was very useful to have concrete suggestions towards our research project from the keynote speakers at the end. Open intellectual exchange to arrive at concrete research proposals was in fact the key motivation of this workshop.

I would first like to point out a certain ambivalence that was expressed by various speakers about whether we live in a Westphalian state system or in a post-Westphalian state system. Diane Dillon-Ridgley mentioned that it is not only the players on the chessboard that have changed, but the chessboard itself. This statement is consistent with the view that we live in a post-Westphalian situation. This in fact reminded me of a meeting that I attended in early 2006 in Los Angeles. The title of that conference was "Reforming or Transforming the UN: What can the UN do in Global Governance?" It appears to me that that conference neglected the UN and focused on civil society. The main organizer stated that we live in a post-Westphalian society. I actually have my doubts about that. I still regard NGOs and civil society organizations as supplementary, complementary, or secondary to the work of states. We need to be aware that by choosing one perspective over the other, our perception of the role of the UN itself and civil society organizations changes dramatically. I don't think these different perspectives and their ramifications were discussed and considered sufficiently during our workshop.

There was larger agreement about the important roles that civil society organizations play currently. We have, however, not gone deep enough into examining dilemmas facing the current world. Nonetheless, I think there was general agreement of the new actors that are now on the chessboard, not only princes, kings, queens, or soldiers, but also merchants and individual citizens of the globe. We did not talk about the rules that govern the chessboard, although inevitably, I think, certain rules will have to change given that we have new players. The most important new players today are civil society organizations and NGOs.

We also considered the role of the private sector – the importance of the Global Compact and its ability to bring business people into the framework of the UN Charter. There seems to be a certain amount of agreement on this. Professor Takahashi sees agreement in 40% of the issues, and compatible views in a further 30%. I actually see more agreement than that, possibly 70% on the roles that these actors will play.

The main issues discussed today are the relationships between these actors and the links between civil society and the state, civil society and the UN, and links to the business sector. Interesting discussions took place and numerous suggestions were made of practical ways to improve such relationships. In terms of the role of the state, some say that it is weakening, but at the same time one can also see recognition of the state's continued preponderant role. In short, there is still ambivalence about the exact nature and future of the state.

An interesting discussion this afternoon disaggregated the state into the legislative and executive branches. The state in terms of the executive branch, the government and bureaucracy, could be quite resistant to the changes, whereas the legislative branch could be more amenable and open to newcomers like civil society organizations. So we cannot really talk about the state as a monolithic entity. The same can be said about the international level, as some mentioned in this afternoon's discussion about the gap between the General Assembly Outcome Document and Kofi Annan's report. The Outcome Document only reflected the lowest common denominators. There were, however, heated discussions among member states about different issues.

The roles of NGOs seem to be better understood and defined than those of other actors. NGOs draw attention to hidden issues, mobilize and capitalize on intellectual resources, bringing issues to the operational level. NGOs can influence the policy-making process and help in the implementation process. NGOs can monitor and review the work of the UN and of states.

We did not really touch upon the leadership question. Who will take leadership? There were some implicit statements but question of who the key actors are, and why these particular actors are the leaders, were not addressed in our discussions. In a way we shied away from that question. Unfortunately specific points presented in the written papers were not really presented during our discussions – such as Mrs. Ise's comment, as well as my own.

The UN system also has to be deconstructed. Professor Takahashi mentioned three layers. I still prefer simply separating the system into two – that is UN#1 and UN#2, as Inis Claude defined it – because UN#1 as the Secretariat includes the headquarters *and* the field offices. UN#2 refers to member states and the organs, including the Security Council, General Assembly and ECOSOC. By definition, member states will have their own national interests. This is quite natural. UN#1, according to the Charter, should not be speaking on behalf of states or groups of states. Rather UN#1 has to speak for the people of the UN. That is the mandate of the Secretariat. My contention is that the international civil service is mandated to lead and project a vision for the future by trying to coordinate the actions of various actors, including UN#2. I think this a very noble task, possibly an impossible task, but this is what they are for. They are not there only to serve the conferences. They are to project certain developmental visions for the humanity as a whole.

I take Mrs. Ise's concern very seriously, about the erosion of the international civil service, micro-managed, and restrained not just by budget but by ideology. Member states are not always true to Articles 100 and 101, but try to influence and direct small matters within the Secretariat. There probably are certain bureaucratic hindrances that limit the international civil service. But in my view, these are rather small compared with other larger macro issues that the Secretariat has to cope with. We all know that the UN budget for peacekeeping operations is dwarfed by the national military budget. It is something like 0.5 %. Though there is concern about bureaucratization and inefficiency – which is true to a certain extent – the larger question that has to be addressed is enabling the Secretariat to project developmental visions for the 21st century.

We gathered quite a bit of food for thought regarding the research design during our discussions today. There are certain definitions and conceptual issues we will still need to clarify. We had concrete suggestions from our keynote speakers at the end – particularly to focus on best practice examples of partnerships between the UN and civil society. It is rather surprising that such studies have not yet been undertaken. I think this project could address this issue and lay down foundations for broader research activities to follow.

There were concerns raised about the legitimacy and representation of NGOs and civil society organizations. In fact, these questions also need to be raised with regard to the states and the current UN system as a whole. There have been practically no Charter amendments except for the enlargement of the Security Council and the ECOSOC. I was rather impressed by the Outcome Document, and taken back by the resistance of the member states to change, particularly by the big powers. I am certain that the Security Council is losing its legitimacy by sticking to the 1945 configurations. They may have Charter or constitutional legitimacy, but their legitimacy in the eyes of people in the world is eroding. The UN, both UN#1 and UN#2, have to be reformed.

I have covered some of the points of today's discussions, but still need to digest everything. This workshop has been informative and enlightening. I am very grateful to the keynote speakers as well as all the other participants for sharing their insights. I hope my last-minute summary will be of some use to your own reflections on the workshop later.

Research Direction: Towards a Trilateral Collaborative Research Project on “New Partnerships of the United Nations System and Global Civil Society”

Here are notes and preliminary proposals by the Planning Committee of the International Cooperation Research Association (ICRA) on the next steps for initiating a concrete trilateral research. The proposals take account of the views expressed at the international workshop held at the International Christian University (ICU) in Tokyo, on 16 March 2006.

International Workshop

The international workshop examined a number of issues facing efforts to build partnerships between different international actors, both state and non-state actors. Given the emerging nature of a new international order after the demise of the cold war, it is natural that experts and practitioners hold different views on the roles that the state, international organizations, civil society organizations, and the private sector can and should play to foster partnerships to provide global public goods in the areas of peace and security, development and human rights, as identified by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report *In Larger Freedom* (March 2005).

While there existed general agreement on the changed roles of the state in the age of globalization, some expressed the view that the state remained the fundamental building block of the contemporary international order and that the Westphalian principle by and large still held; while others placed more emphasis on the trilateral interplay among the state, civil society and private sector that, they maintained, could better represent the actual division of labour in coping with issues of global concern. Beyond the importance of various actors, participants at the workshop recognized that each of these actors was indispensable to address the challenges that humanity faced in the 21st century. Several participants stressed that international organizations, in particular United Nations system agencies, have already occupied a crucial pivotal position in promoting synergistic partnerships among societal actors. They also argued that UN system agencies’ partnerships with civil society organizations hold the key to enhancing this pivotal role.

Preliminary Proposals: Considerations and Possible Issues for Study

- 1) A time-limited policy-oriented collaborative research project among institutions in US, Canada and Japan – three countries that have traditionally been strong supporters of the United Nations – will be useful to sustain the UN reform process. Given the fact that these three countries have significant experiences in using various public fora to develop national policies vis-à-vis the United Nations with the participation of civil society, sharing their experiences for the benefit of other countries, as well as for their own will be very useful to promote public engagement in United Nations reform. (It has to be noted that there are inherent and inevitable limitations to UN reform that has so far been left almost entirely to governmental deliberations. Indeed a number of crucial issues were dropped from the Outcome Document of September 2005. Furthermore, only tangential reference was given to the multi-stakeholder approach in the document.)

- 2) A systematic study of successful cases of partnership building among the UN system, civil society organizations (CSOs) and business will be made to pinpoint lessons. The theoretical approach to the study of such partnership building should be inductive, based on studies of accumulated experience in UN activities in the areas of peace and security, development, human rights and the environment.
- 3) There has been a marked increase in the participation of CSOs in operational activities of the UN in such fields as humanitarian relief, technical cooperation for development, and democratic governance. There is a question, however, as to whether and how participation of CSOs in the policy process at all levels of the UN work in these fields can be increased.
- 4) Possibilities might be explored for replicating and promoting non-state actors' participation in the work of the UN, or in treaty regimes set up under the auspices of the UN, in the areas of human rights and the environment. In light of the increasing use of the Arria formula meetings in recent years where CSOs and private sector actors are invited to the Security Council, new avenues might open for more active participation of non-state actors in UN-mediated conflict prevention, conflict mitigation and post-conflict peacebuilding.
- 5) The post-Rio decade witnessed a proliferation of CSR (corporate social responsibility) codes of international significance, such as the revised OECD Guidelines (2000), the Global Compact (2000), Norms on the Responsibilities of TNCs on Human Rights, adopted by the Human Rights Sub-Commission (2003), along with many private multi-stakeholder codes derived from engagement between business and CSOs. Furthermore, the Shanghai Declaration (Dec. 2005) at the Global Compact Summit stressed the governmental role to promote the Global Compact principles in national corporate governance. These new developments, along with CSO's watchdog role as well as collaborative problem-solving ventures with business deserve careful attention.
- 6) Dramatic changes are taking place continuously since the beginning of the new century, which presents yet more challenges to the UN system. A successful response to the challenges will ultimately depend on the capacity and quality of its leadership – leadership in building and promoting partnerships in the context of a growing number of actors and rapidly evolving issues of sustainable peace and development. The UN therefore needs to be reformed in order to serve as an initiator of partnership building not only with and among its member states, but also with broader constituencies that include civil society, parliamentarians, local authorities and the private sector. Several recommendations of the Cardoso Report that are particularly relevant to the “convening role of the UN: fostering multi-constituency processes” and “global leadership” will provide a useful basis for overcoming barriers of formal intergovernmental processes to make the UN a center of new multilateralism.
- 7) The changing nature of multilateralism today points to the need to consider whether the UN must become a more outward-looking and networked organization with greater emphasis on *ad hoc* alliances of like-minded and willing partners focused on achieving specific global public goods. If this is the new direction for the UN to follow to stay relevant in our changing world, questions may arise regarding how to reconcile this with the traditional principle of the UN as a universal decision-making forum for all – as the UN was originally designed to be. When there are too many

competing claims and definite finite resources, the use of *ad hoc* alliance of multiple actors with the required political and financial resources, seems to make more sense than relying on universal intergovernmental decision-making without capacity to act adequately to specific situations. It has to be noted that this argument is made with the proviso that the organization will maintain its normative function, committed to the best interests of humanity.

Output

This project is limited to two years. The proposed output during this time could include:

(1) *a book* containing academic and policy-oriented contributions on building new partnerships among the UN, civil society and the business; or

(2) *a series of three or four pamphlet sized position papers* on timely issues that are focused on influencing specific policy processes and discussions in the UN system. The contributors will be drawn from academia, the UN, civil society and the private sector in US, Canada and Japan, as well as from several other countries, thus providing a broad range of perspectives, viewpoints and experiences.

It has to be noted that the above list of seven issue areas is only preliminary. Through our consultations with our partner institutions in the US and Canada we hope to identify three or a maximum of four issues for study.

ANNEXES

I. Program of the International Workshop, 16 March 2006

II. List of Participants

III. Two Letters of Support from Institutions in Canada and US

- 1) Paul Heinbecker(Director, Laurier Centre for Global Relations, Distinguished Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation(CIGI), and former Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN)

- 2) Michael Doyle(Chair, ACUNS Board and Professor at Columbia University) and Thomas Weiss(Director, Ralph Bunche Institute and Professor at City University of New York)



International Workshop



Towards a New Partnership of the United Nations System and Global Civil Society

Preparatory Workshop for a collaborative research project with the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) and Columbia University, with the institutional support of the Ralph Bunche Institute (City University of New York), and the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Canada

**16 March 2006, International Christian University
Conference Room AB 206**

Opening 10:00 – 10:30

- Welcome by **Shin Chiba**, Dean of Graduate School, ICU
- Introduction to the Workshop by **Tatsuro Kunugi**, ICU-COE/UNU-IAS

Session One 10:30 – 12:00

*Moderator: **Katsuhiko Mori**, ICU*

Role of Civil Society for Sustainable Peace and Development

- Keynote by **Cyril Ritchie**, President, Federation of International Institutions in Geneva
- Keynote by **Dianne Dillon-Ridgley**, Representative, World YWCA; Global Water Partnership

Session Two 13:30 – 15:00

Moderator: Kazuo Takahashi, ICU/UNU

UN Reform Process and Multi-stakeholders

- Keynote by **Vesselin Popovski**, Director of Studies, Peace and Governance Programme, UNU
- Short presentations

Session Three 15:30 – 17:00

Moderator: Mikoto Usui, Seisa Univ./ UNU-IAS

Leadership of the UN System and Civil Society

- Keynote by **Alistair Edgar**, Executive Director, ACUNS
- Short presentations
- Discussion on research design and aimed impact on policy-making process

Summing up 17:15

Takeo Uchida, Chuo University/UNU

Reception: 17:30 – 19:30

Alumni House

List of Participants

1. Keynote Speakers

- Dianne Dillon-Ridgley, Representative, World YWCA
- Alistair Edgar, Executive Director, Academic Council on the United Nations System
- Vesselin Popovski, Director of Studies on International Order and Justice, UN University
- Cyril Ritchie, President, Federation of International Institutions in Geneva

2. Workshop Organizers and Moderators

- Shin Chiba, Dean of the Graduate School, ICU
- Tatsuro Kunugi, Visiting Professor, Center of Excellence Program (COE), ICU;
Visiting Professor, UNU-Institute of Advanced Studies (IAS); Representative, ICRA
- Katsuhiko Mori, Associate Professor, ICU
- Kazuo Takahashi, Professor, ICU; Visiting Professor, UNU
- Takeo Uchida, Professor, Chuo University, Visiting Professor, UNU
- Mikoto Usui, Professor, Seisa University, Visiting Professor, UNU-IAS

3. Specially Invited Experts and Scholars

- Wakako Hironaka, member of the House of Councilors; Vice-President, Democratic Party; former Environment Minister
- Yukihisa Fujita, Vice Director-General, International Department, Democratic Party; former Member of the Diet (1996- 2000, 2003- 2005)
- Charles Aanenson, Counselor (International Cooperation), US Embassy, Tokyo
- David Drake, Minister/ Counsellor (Political/ Economic), Canadian Embassy, Tokyo
- Martha Cottam, Professor of Political Science, Washington State University
- Otwin Marenin, Professor of Criminal Justice, Washington State University
- T. V. Reed, Professor of English and Director of American Studies, Washington State University
- Wilhelm Vosse, Associate Professor of Political Science, ICU
- Jacqueline Wasilewski, Professor of Intercultural Communication, ICU
- Kunio Katakura, Chief Representative, Islamic Studies Society 21; former Ambassador to Egypt and Iraq
- Sumihiro Kuyama, former President, Joint Inspection Unit of the UN System (JIU), and Deputy Executive Director, UN Habitat
- Momoyo Ise, former Executive Director, Asia Women's Fund; former Chief Administrative Officer, UNU
- Shinichi Hasegawa, Director, ILO Office, Tokyo; former ILO Representative for Asia and Pacific, Bangkok
- Susumu Nakamaru, Founder, Sun Management Institute; former CSR Advisor, Ricoh Group
- Akio Nomura, Advisor, Global Compact Japan Network; former Director, UNIC Tokyo; Director-General, Asahi Shimbun Research Center
- Mikiko Otani, Attorney-at-Law, Otani Law Office; Member of the Delegation to Third Committee, General Assembly 60th Session
- Akira Kawasaki, Representative, Peace Boat; former Executive Director, Peace Depot
- Yukie Osa, Adviser, Japan Platform Council; member, JCBL Steering Committee

- Kiyotaka Takahashi, Board Member, Japan Volunteer Center, Associate Professor, Keisen University
- Yoshio Takano, Director, Intellectual Exchange Division, The Japan Foundation Center of Global Partnership
- Yasushi Katsuma, Programme Coordinator, UNICEF Office, Tokyo
- Masanori Kobayashi, Senior Researcher, Institute for Global Environment Strategies
- Midori Okabe, Assistant Manager, Technical Visit Project, Scandinavian Tourist Board
- Johanna Stratton, International Coordinator, Peace Boat; Coordinator, Northeast Asia Regional Secretariat of GPPAC

4. **Observers**

- Kaori Akimoto, Tokyo Steiner Association for Children
 - Cherine Badawi, Rotary World Peace Fellow, ICU
 - Takahiro Furushima, The Japanese Red Cross Society
 - Hana Heinneken, Hironaka Office
 - Ken Inoue, Director, Industry Department, Asian Productivity Organization
 - Yasuhito Murakami, Project Formulation Advisor for the African Union, JICA
 - Sayaka Oga, Tokyo Institute of Technology
 - Daisuke Onuki, Associate Professor, Tokai University
 - Arthur Romano, Rotary World Peace Fellow, Bradford University
 - Toru Sakane, Tokyo University Graduate School of Law
 - Rika Watanabe, International Coordinator, Peace Boat
-
- Naoko Chiba, Social Science Research Institute, ICU
 - Tatsuya Oniki, Graduate School of Public Administration, ICU
 - Kazuto Tsuruga, Strategic Planning Officer, UNDP; former Associate Producer, Cultural Affairs Division, The Yomiuri Shimbun
 - Akira Uchimura, Graduate School of Public Administration, ICU
 - Takuya Watanabe, Graduate School of Public Administration, ICU
 - Yoshinaga Yonekawa, Graduate School of Public Administration, ICU

Wilfrid Laurier University

Paul Heinbecker, Director
Laurier Centre for Global Relations, Governance and Policy

Professor Tatsuro Kunugi
Coordinator of the ICU/COE-ICRA
Joint Research Project
International Cooperation Research Association
Tokyo
Japan

9 March 2006

Dear Professor Kunugi,

I am writing to express my interest in, and general support for, the project “Towards a New Partnership of the United Nations System and Global Civil Society”.

Unfortunately due to priority commitments, I am unable to attend the 16 March 2006 workshop in Tokyo. I do, nevertheless, look forward to hearing more from the workshop regarding the presentations that will be made there. As I am sure you know, in previous capacity as Permanent Representative and Ambassador of Canada to the United Nations in New York, I strongly supported enhanced civil society organization participation in United Nations activities as an effective way of advancing the human security agenda that was so central to Canada’s, and Japan’s foreign policy.

The agenda, speakers and participants for the 16 March workshop appear to be a very promising step towards your proposed trilateral Japan-Canada-US research project. I am pleased to send you this letter of support. I very much look forward to exploring potential future forms of cooperation in pursuit of this research project.

Yours Sincerely

(signed)

Paul Heinbecker

Director
Laurier Centre for Global Relations

Distinguished Fellow
Centre for International Governance
Innovation (CIGI)

Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies

10 March 2006

Professor Tatsuhiro Kunugi
 Coordinator, ICU/COE-ICRA Joint Research Project
 International Cooperation Research Association
 Tokyo, Japan

Dear Professor Kunugi,

Thank you for your kind invitation to attend and participate in the 16 March 2006 ICU/COE-ICRA workshop “Towards a New Partnership of the United Nations System and Global Civil Society” in Tokyo, Japan. The topic is certainly timely, as civil society organizations have played and should play an increasingly meaningful role in helping to shape the future of the United Nations if the world organization is to reinvigorate itself and maintain its relevance in the face of its many contemporary internal and external challenges. Indeed, an earlier research effort by ACUNS led to one of the first books on this topic – see Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker, *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

Unfortunately, prior commitments meant that neither of us was able to take part in this event. Your draft program for the workshop looks very interesting, and I am sure that you will have excellent presentations from the various speakers throughout the day. We would be pleased to receive from your office copies of any papers or presentations that might be made available from the program. And we will, of course, be fully briefed by Alistair Edgar after his return.

Regarding the broader research project that you have proposed on this subject, we would be pleased to co-host a meeting at a mutually convenient time in the future that can help to bring together scholars and practitioners in the New York area. I understand that the ACUNS Secretariat is seeking financial support from North American foundations for this purpose. Finally, I hope that the Japan Foundation will see fit to provide strong support for the overall project, as its leadership and commitment will be vital to obtaining similar support here.

Yours Sincerely

(signed)

Michael W. Doyle
 Chair, ACUNS
 Harold Brown Professor of International
 Affairs, Law and Political Science
 School of International and Public Affairs
 Columbia University, New York

(signed)

Thomas G. Weiss
 Chair – elect, ACUNS
 Presidential Professor of Political Science
 Director, Ralph Bunche Institute for
 International Studies
 The Graduate Center
 The City University of New York

ADDRESSES

International Christian University
21st Century Center of Excellence Program
Research and Education for Peace, Security and Conviviality
3-10-2 Osawa, Mitaka-shi, Tokyo 181-8585

Telephone: +81-422-33-3636

FAX: +81-422-33-3441

Email: coe-office@icu.ac.jp

<http://subsite.icu.ac.jp/coe>

International Cooperation Research Association
1-15-7 Osawa, Mitaka-shi, Tokyo 181-0015

Telephone: +81-422-34-6825

FAX: +81-422-34-8805

Email: icra@parkcity.ne.jp

**International Christian University (ICU)
21st Century Center of Excellence Program
Research and Education for
Peace, Security and Conviviality**

ICU Center of Excellence (COE) Program – Research and Education for Peace, Security and Conviviality is a five year program, 2003 – 2008. It aims at the advancement of comprehensive peace studies for the 21st century. Building on ICU’s tradition of liberal arts and sciences, the program inquires into the true meaning of peace, security and conviviality as three key concepts of the dynamics of peace processes in a globalizing world. It also analyzes the interlinkages between the three concepts through multi-disciplinary approaches, and it ultimately aims to formulate a grand theory of peace studies that will adequately guide research and education for global peace and human security by way of overcoming the limitations of the intellectual tools of the 20th century.

In achieving this objective, ICU/COE works closely with a number of research and educational institutions with which ICU has maintained exchange and other collaborative programs. The work of ICU/COE program is further enhanced by joint research projects newly established in conjunction with global networks of scholars, practitioners and policy makers.

**International Cooperation
Research Association**

International Cooperation Research Association (ICRA) was formed in 1991 as an association of scholars, practitioners, policy-makers and others active in the work and study of multilateralism centering around the United Nations system. The main purpose of ICRA is to encourage research, education and public discourse which contribute to the wider appreciation of the work of international organizations and promote multilateral cooperation and partnership.

Members hold monthly research meetings on selected topics. The outcome has been published with individual members’ recommendations on international cooperation policy and reform of the UN system. Under a joint research project with the Academic Council on the UN System and the UN University (UNU), ICRA contributed to the organization of international symposia on peace and environment held at the UNU in 1993 and 1995, and an international workshop on human security held in 1994 at the Ralph Bunche Institute, New York. ICRA was also instrumental in preparing for the World Civil Society Conference 1999 – a UNU-initiated participatory research project.